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LEAGUE STRUCTURE & STADIUM RENT-SEEKING-THE ROLE
OF ANTITRUST REVISITED
David Haddock, Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag
"0 wad some Power the giftie gie us"t
Abstract
Professional North American sporting teams receive enormous
public funding for new and renovated stadiums after threatening to
depart their hometowns, or by actually moving elsewhere. In contrast,
English sporting teams neither receive much public money for such
projects, nor move towns. This Article argues that no inherent cultural
or political transatlantic variations cause the differences; rather, it is the
industrial organization of sports in the two countries-the structure of
league control-that enables rent-seeking by American teams but not by
their English counterparts. Cross-country time series data contrasting
American professional football and baseball stadiums with English
soccer grounds support our claim, as does data contrasting the stadiums
of geographically flexible National Football League teams with those of
functionally immobile major collegiate football teams.
North American sports leagues are cartels: they control entry of
teams, then collaborate to maximize effective rent-seeking, stave off
competition, and keep prices high. In most of the world, competitive
merit determines entrance into leagues via a system known as
promotion and relegation, which demotes the worst performing teams in
one competitive tier to the next lower tier at season's end,
simultaneously promoting an equivalent number of top teams from the
division below. The fluidity created by promotion and relegation
severely undermines the credibility of a team's threat to leave town by
creating alternative, less costly entry points into the league. Open entry
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mitigates pressure to engage in intercity competition over scarce team
slots, and thus relieves the pressure to transfer wealth from public
taxpayers to private team owners through stadium funding.
Stadium rent-seeking illustrates a weakness of antitrust law in
remedying problems at the intersection of market and political
organization. The anticompetitive structure of American leagues
provides the platform for stadium rent-seeking, but the resulting harm is
arguably a political injury rather than an antitrust offense. Nonetheless,
this Article argues that finding a way to impose a promotion and
relegation system would be the least intrusive means for the United
States and Canada to limit sporting league cartel behavior to its proper
functions, such as arranging schedules and defining uniform rules. The
unpromising solution under antitrust law makes it all the more
imperative for Congress to address this costly injury.
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INTRODUCTION
The median family home in the United States is about thirty-seven
years old' but Major League Baseball (MLB) and National Football
League (NFL) stadiums average less than twenty-three years of age. 2
Several times a decade a completely new edifice, often in a city over a
thousand miles away, supplants some team's relatively new stadium.
Governments at various levels invest heavily in stadiums for wealthy
professional franchises.
In stark contrast, this season the mean age of playing grounds in
arguably the world's top soccer league, the English Premier League,
exceeds seventy-eight years. The contrast between Premier League and
American stadium ages seems quite odd given the similar
configurations arid functional interchangeability of soccer and American
football fields.3 Stadium age is not the only transatlantic difference:
English soccer teams in every competitive tier renovate frequently but
rarely build an entirely new stadium, wealthy upper tier teams typically
bear much or all construction and renovation cost, and English teams
almost never abandon their hometowns.
This Article argues that neither cultural nor political transatlantic
differences are responsible for this disparity; instead, a difference in the
organization of sports-the structure of entry control-facilitates rent-
seeking by North American teams that is unavailing for their English
4counterparts.
Top tier American teams use their respective leagues as cartels:
impeding entry by potential competitors (whether the competitors be
teams or entire leagues), collaborating when seeking government
handouts, and keeping quantity low and prices high. To avoid costly
formation of an entire league, a would-be sporting franchise must obtain
the approval of the existing teams acting jointly through their league;
1. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2009
1 tbl.1-1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/hl50-09.pdf.
2. See infra Figure 1.
3. The 1994 Men's Soccer World Cup, hosted by the United States, used professional
and collegiate football stadiums exclusively. See 1994 FIFA World Cup, U.S. SOCCER,
http://www.ussoccer.com/AboutlHistory/US-Soccer-as-Host/1994-FIFA-World-Cup.aspx (last
visited Sept. 15, 2012). American rules football games played in England, including an annual
NFL game at London's Wembley Stadium, use soccer stadiums exclusively. See, e.g., NFL in
the UK, NFL LONDON, http://www.nfllondon.net/history.html (last visited Sep. 31, 2012).
4. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate leagues, as does Wales to some degree,
so the reader must not think us careless when we speak not of Britain but of England. Similarly,
though Canada has a separate professional football league, with the exception of the NFL all the
major leagues with U.S. teams also have Canadian teams, so we refer collectively to (North)
American teams, leagues, and governments, using U.S. only if the context is inapplicable to
Canada.
32013]
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such acquiescence comes rarely and at a very high price. The difficulty
an American challenger has entering the industry without entering the
incumbent league gives incumbents a credible threat to withhold or
withdraw all representation from cities that refuse to absorb much or all
of the cost of cutting-edge facilities. Not only can a franchise leave, but
it can also be confident that no new team will soon replace it; therein
lies the heart of its negotiating power.5
Los Angeles reveals a glaring example of stadium rent-seeking. In
1961 the Chargers moved to San Diego, then in 1995 the Rams moved
to St. Louis and the Raiders to Oakland. Each of those teams relocated
to a newer, publically financed stadium in a much smaller city.6
Henceforth, the second most populous Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SMSA) in the United StateS7 has lacked an NFL team. That is
seventeen years and counting. It is noteworthy that the Raiders initially
arrived in Los Angeles only because Oakland refused to update its
stadium as the team demanded, then returned north when L.A. likewise
proved intransigent and Oakland saw the error of its ways. Now, the
Chargers, Rams, and Raiders are among teams thought most likely to
relocate to Los Angeles-but only if local government contributes
heavily toward a new stadium.8
Regardless of the sport-soccer, basketball, ice hockey, or others
rarely played in America-in most of the world, entrance into leagues
opens annually. A team earns or loses its place based on competitive
merit via a system known as "promotion and relegation." The system
demotes the worst performing teams in one competitive tier to the next
5. Departing teams have been replaced, but, as exampled by the Cleveland Browns, only
after the losing city agreed to substantial new subsidies. See Aaron Kuriloff & Darrell Preston,
In Stadium Building Spree, U.S. Taxpayers Lose $4 Billion, BLOOMBERG, (Sept. 5, 2012, 1:03
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/in-stadiu m-building-spree-u-s-taxpayers-
lose-4-billion.html ("To land an expansion team in 1998, Cleveland provided a $315 million
publicly financed building.").
6. Taxpayers assumed liability in one way or another for $60 million and $26 million
dollars of renovations at Qualcomm Stadium for the Chargers and the Oakland Arena for the
Raiders, respectively. The taxpayer bill for the Rams' new stadium in St. Louis was $290
million. See Raymond J. Keating, Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship Between Major League
Sports and Government, 339 POL'Y ANALYSIS 1, 14-15 tbl.1 (1999).
7. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF INCORPORATED PLACES: APRIL 1,
2010 To JULY 1, 2011 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2011/
files/SUB-EST20 11 -IP.csvhttp://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/201 1/files/SUB-
EST201 1-IP.csv.
8. See Arash Markazi, LA has tentative stadium agreement, ESPN.coM (Jul. 26, 2011,
3:23 AM), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/nfl/story//id/6801664/city-reveals-tentative-agreeme
nt-la-stadium. Jacksonville is another potential mover, but Minnesota lost interest recently after
recently successfully using the threat to pressure its host government for a third new stadium
since the team's formation in 1960. See id.
[Vol. 65
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lower tier at season's end, replacing them with an equivalent number of
top teams from the division below. Promotion and relegation has been
standard in upper tier English soccer since 1898, right after the merger
of the Football League with the Football Alliance.9 The system enables
a team to improve its position unilaterally through skillful performance,
which correlates with host city wealth, population, and preferences-in
other words, the team's ability to generate adequate revenue. Promotion
and relegation's fluidity creates alternative entry points for teams
anxious to represent the locality, thus undermining the credibility of a
team's threat to leave and mitigating pressure for intercity competition.
The literature on stadium rent-seeking overwhelmingly concludes
that the practice is harmful in numerous ways.' 0 Premature replacement
of stadiums is expensive, wasteful of scarce public resources (diverting
money from alternative infrastructure such as hospitals and roads), and
seldom leads to the positive economic and cultural benefits that
advocates routinely tout.
Some commentators focus on the fact that American leagues permit
teams to move as the root cause of stadium rent-seeking, but that
analysis confuses cause and effect; the ready availability of rent-seeking
gains incentivizes leagues to permit team movement. Others see the
problem as rooted in avid public interest in sport or the failings of the
political system. This Article contends that the problem is broader than
simple team movement, enthusiasm for sports, or the weaknesses of
politicians; the problem is that league structure vests entry control in the
hands of incumbents. This Article supports that claim with cross-
country data contrasting American professional football and baseball
stadiums with English soccer grounds, and also by comparing stadiums
of footloose NFL teams with those of functionally immobile major
collegiate football teams.
Given the evidence that stadium rent-seeking is a product of closed
league structures, the corresponding solution would seem to be some
kind of structural remedy. This Article argues that imposition of
promotion and relegation would be the least intrusive means for the
U.S. and Canadian national governments to shield local governments
from league abuses, thus limiting cartel behavior to legitimate functions,
such as arranging schedules and defining uniform rules." For over a
9. See History of the Football League, THE FOOTBALL LEAGUE (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://www.football-league.co.uk/page/History/HistoryDetail/0,, 10794-1357277,00.html.
10. See infra Part I.
11. Ross and Szymanski, Noll, and Cain and Haddock have also discussed how the lack of
a promotion and relegation system contributes to the stadium rent seeking phenomenon in North
America, although without our data and mode of analysis. See Stephen F. Ross & Stefan
Szymanski, Open Competition in League Sports, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 625, 627 (2002) (arguing
52013]
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century, aggrieved plaintiffs and government enforcement agencies
have looked to antitrust law (competition law in the rest of the world) to
right anticompetitive wrongs such as price fixing and cartelization.
However, it is unclear whether current antitrust law can provide any
remedy to the American stadium rent-seeking problem-but not for the
reasons conventionally assumed. The decision to operate as a closed
league presents an obvious structural impediment to competition.
League cartels make new entry all but impossible and thus provide
franchises with extraordinary leverage over cities to negotiate for ever
greater subsidies. This closed structure hides in plain sight, obscured by
the belief that there is no workable way to have a sporting league
without it. Although producing a sporting competition does require
cooperation with respect to certain features-such as rules, uniforms,
equipment, league size, and competition schedule-the promotion and
relegation system common throughout most of the world shows that the
essentials of cooperation are compatible with freedom of entry.
Obviously, once a schedule of matches is determined for a season, the
league must exclude outsiders temporarily-but this is no justification
for a cartel structure that endures across seasons.
Running a permanently closed shop is an optional feature designed
to benefit incumbents and not in any way essential to maintaining a
sporting league. Thus, aspects of league behavior toward their host
cities that depend on a permanently closed shop may violate the first
mandate of antitrust law, § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
unreasonable agreements between competitors to restrain trade.12
Because existing teams determine whether new entry will be allowed, a
threat by an individual team to relocate may comprise an implicit threat
of a concerted boycott. However, courts have proven reluctant to use
antitrust law to address competition problems at the intersection of
political and market structures. They may take the view that, although
stadium rent-seeking results from the closed market structure of
sporting leagues, the matter nonetheless concerns a political rather than
a market injury. Likewise, we also anticipate that at the remedy stage
promotion and relegation would "raise consumer welfare by increasing effective competition
among the teams in [thel league" and undermine the existing potential for abuse of market
power); Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues: The
Case of English Football, 3 J. SPORTS EcON. 169, 175-77 (2002) (noting that the lack of
promotion and relegation contributes to rent seeking in North America); Louis P. Cain & David
D. Haddock, Similar Economic Histories, Diferent Industrial Structures: Transatlantic
Contrasts in the Evolution of Professional Sports Leagues, 65 J. EcoN. HisT. 1116, 1127-30
(2005) (describing the divergence in power between English and American leagues arising due
to the open entrance created by a promotion and relegation system in the former and not the
latter).
12. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
[Vol. 656
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courts would be reluctant to try to determine the best way to transition
from current league cartels to a system of open competition through
promotion and relegation.
This Article argues, however, that the same factors that make
judicial intervention unlikely make it apparent that Congress should
take steps to correct a distorted market structure. Although it is not the
only potential solution, adopting a system of open competition through
promotion and relegation would address the problem and leave sports
otherwise free from unnecessary government interference, restructuring
incumbent incentives rather than directly interfering with team and
league management.
The key to addressing stadium rent-seeking is to identify its causes
and consider solutions that address those causes. Accordingly, this
Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses more fully the nature of the
American problem and its contrast with England. Part II considers the
causes: demand-the public choice problems that exaggerate a city's
inelastic demand for local league representation; supply--comparing
the closed system of American leagues with the freedom of entry
created by a promotion and relegation system; and free movement-
contrasting team incentive and ability to move in America with the
derived incentive for loyalty in England. Part III examines the role that
antitrust law could play in addressing the anticompetitive organization
of sporting leagues. It explains why current antitrust law may not offer a
complete solution to the problem and why the legislative imposition of a
system of promotion and relegation may be preferable to court ordered
remedies.
I. PUBLIC SPENDING FOR PRIVATE BENEFIT
American governments spend astonishing sums constructing new
sporting facilities for private professional sports teams. Between 1970
and the end of 1999, the tally in the United States was $10.4 billion.' 3
Public subsidies for stadium renovation over the same period amounted
to a further $1.4 billion.14 The NFL alone has commanded public
stadium subsidies of at least $2.4 billion since 2001.'s As the studies
discussed below show, despite promoters' rationalizations to the
contrary, subsidies are nearly entirely a wealth transfer from the general
public-and certainly not merely or even predominantly from sports
13. See John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics ofSports Facilities and Their
Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 96 tbl. 1 (2000) (summarizing data in Keating, supra note
6, at 11-15.). These figures are in 1997 dollars. By decade, the figures break down to $5.10
million, $1.58 million and $3.75 million for in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, respectively. See id.
14. See id.
15. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
2013] 7
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fans-to a select group of private franchises and their players. A few
examples are informative.
Estimates indicate that taxpayers will bear more than half of the
cost, $1.19 billion, of the New Yankee Stadium that opened in the
Bronx in 2009.16 A taxpayer burden of $1.19 billion amounts to nearly
$200 per family living in the tristate New York City SMSA, or $500 per
family within the city itself. Given the choice, how many of those
families would have volunteered such a contribution to the third most
valuable sports team in the world?17 Being evenhanded, taxpayers
simultaneously forked over an additional $614 million of the $831
million cost of a new stadium for the crosstown Mets,18 bringing the
ratios to $300 per family in the SMSA and nearly $700 in the city. The
public's largesse is unreciprocated. Yankee fans now pay 39% more on
average for standard tickets,' 9 and there are fewer of them available to
boot. By revealed preference, the combination of fewer seats at higher
prices must make sense from the teams' perspectives, but is
incongruous given the projects' massive public subsidies.
A further incongruity is the demolition of so much recently built or
refurbished infrastructure. Milwaukee built the first completely new
publicly funded stadium intended solely as a professional baseball field
attracting the Braves away from Boston upon completion in 1953.2f
16. The remaining $1.123 million was privately financed. See Neil Demause,
Private/Public Cost Breakdown For New Yankees/Mets Stadiums, FIELDOFSCHEMES.COM (Jan.
2009), http://www.fieldofschemes.com/documents/Yanks-Mets-costs.pdf.
17. Manchester United is the world's most valuable team, worth $1.835 billion, followed
closely by the Dallas Cowboys at $1.65 billion and the New York Yankees at $1.6 billion. See
Michael K. Ozanian & Kurt Badenhausen, SportsMoney 50-50: The World's Most Powerful
Teams and Athletes, FORBES.COM (Jul. 22, 2010, 6:40 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0809/sports-tiger-woods-kobe-bryant-floyd-mayweather-
50-50 2.html.
18. Raymond J. Keating, The Sporting Fellow: Old-Time Brooklyn in Queens, LONG
ISLAND SENTINEL (Jul. 13, 2009), http://longislandsentinelsports.blogspot.com/2009/07/sporting-
fellow-old-time-brooklyn-in.html.
19. See Victor Matheson & Brad R. Humphreys, PILOTs and Public Policy: Steering
Through the Economic Ramifications, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 280 (2009).
20. The new stadium's seating capacity is 50,287, whereas at abandonment the old
stadium could seat 56,936. The Yankees had sold more than 70,000 tickets for some games prior
to an earlier publically supported renovation. See Stadium Comparison, NEW YORK YANKEES,
http://newyorkyankees.mlb.com/nyy/ballpark/new-stadium-comparison.jsphttp://newyork.yank
ees.mlb.com/nyy/ballpark/newstadium-comparisonjsp (last visited Sept. 15, 2012); Yankee
Stadium, BALLPARKS.COM, http://www.ballparks.com/baseball/american/yankee.htm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2008).
21. Baltimore built Venable Stadium at public expense in 1922. Venable sometimes
served as a neutral venue for collegiate football games such as Army-Navy. No professional
team used it until 1944 when the city's International League baseball Orioles lost its playing
field to fire. Renamed Memorial Stadium after World War II, the stadium was rebuilt during
8 [Vol. 65
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During the first season, the team set a National League attendance
record. Following the 1966 season, however, the Braves left for a still
newer stadium in Atlanta. County Stadium was nearly abandoned then,
but received a reprieve when the expansion franchise in Seattle,
dissatisfied with its stadium, moved to Milwaukee two years later-but
today none of those stadiums remains standing. 22
Kansas City and Milwaukee had been rivals in the minor American
Association. In 1955, Kansas City followed Milwaukee's lead,
replacing its minor league stadium in haste and at substantially
enhanced cost after the Athletics made a firm but contingent
commitment to move from Philadelphia.23 As had happened with the
Braves sojourn in Milwaukee, the stay was brief The team was enticed
away thirteen years later by Oakland's new stadium. Following a brief
interlude-coupled with a Missouri Senator's threat to initiate a
Congressional attack on baseball's privileged antitrust status 24a new
expansion team used K.C.'s Municipal Stadium for an additional four
years.25 American professional sports teams do not like hand-me-
downs, however, so the city replaced the eighteen-year-old stadium with
a new one.2 6
What is so very striking about these examples is not merely the
destruction of new stadiums, but that teams are often able to convince
local politicians that their facility is obsolete before the government has
even finished paying for it. New Jersey, for example, still owed about
$110 million when they tore down thirty-three-year-old Giants Stadium
27to make way for New Meadowlands Stadium. Likewise, in 2010,
taxpayers still owed more than $80 million for the Kingdome that
1949 and 1950 for use by the Colts of the All American Football Conference and by the Orioles.
The Colts folded after using the stadium for one season, though an NFL expansion team of the
same name reoccupied the field in 1953. The St. Louis Browns moved to Baltimore in 1954,
evicting the minor league baseball team from both its field and its name.
22. See Andrew Clem, (Milwaukee) County Stadium, CLEM'S BASEBALL BLOG,
http://www.andrewclem.com/Baseball/MilwaukeeCountyStadium.html (last updated Feb. 28,
2011, 10:45 PM).
23. Round the clock construction took only ninety days. See John Peterson, History of the
A 's, KANSAS CITY BASEBALL HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://kansascitybaseballhistoricalsociety
.com/jan%20article.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2012).
24. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StuartSymington under "Other Issues"
25. Kansas City Sports Stadiums, Arenas and Ballparks History, ALL STARR SPORTS ZONE
(Feb. 18, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.allstarrsports.com/index.php/kansas-city-sports/95-
kansas-city-sports-stadiums.
26. See Kaujfnan Stadium: The History of Kauffman Stadium, KANSAS CITY ROYALS,
http://kansascity.royals.mlb.com/kc/ballpark/history.jsp (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
27. Ken Belson, As Stadiums Vanish, Their Debt Lives On, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/sports/08stadium.html?pagewanted=allhttp://
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/08/sports/08stadium.html?pagewanted=all.
2013]) 9
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Seattle opened in 1976 but razed in 2000.28
While discussing an early draft of this article, a professor living in
Boston pointed to the Patriots, Celtics, and Bruins as constituting
exceptions in the U.S. system, claiming that they had paid for their own
stadiums. 2 9 Exceptions to the rule of stadium rent-seeking do not
disprove the phenomenon-there is always going to be a distribution of
success in teams' rent-seeking abilities. Moreover, the so-called
exceptions are in fact quite misleading. Many forms of public stadium
subsidization are not immediately apparent to casual observers, so the
actual magnitude of subsidy is opaque. As such, it often appears that
teams have paid their own way though they have not.
Public subsidies come in a complex variety of forms that obscures
their true cost: free land, free rent, publicly funded construction,
renovation, and infrastructure, the assumption of debts, tax exemptions
for creditors receiving interest on bonds, and property and sales tax
exemptions are common features, whereas straight cash payments are
rare. 3 The complexity of stadium financing is an important ingredient
of the public choice dynamic that allows for such massive wealth
transfers from taxpayers to private for-profit franchises for four reasons.
First, wealth transfers in the form of publicly financed stadiums are
advantageous because, while cash is obviously a gift, a new or
renovated stadium can be labeled as an infrastructure investment. The
notion that building a public stadium for a primarily private use is an
investment is assisted by the fact that stadiums are one of the few forms
of infrastructure that actually produce revenue streams. As such, they
can be made to appear on paper as if they are investments rather than
transfers of wealth, even if the city is investing far more money than it
ever expects to receive in revenue from concession stands, license fees,
and other sources.
28. Id.
29. Discussant comment at the Searle Center's Fourth Annual Conference on Antitrust
Economics and Competition Policy (2011).
30. See generally Judith Grant Long, Full Count: The Real Cost of Public Funding for
Major League Sports Facilities, 6 J. SPORTS EcoN. 119 (2005); Ross D. Weiner, Financing
Techniques and Stadium Subsidies in the United States, 11 J. URB. TECH. 41 (2004). For
example, the State of Missouri and the City of St. Louis assumed the Rams' $30 million debt to
the City of Anaheim to secure the team's move to St. Louis. The Rams were also given $15
million to cover relocation expenses. Likewise Montreal and the Province of Quebec gave the
Expos' new owners $33 million in 1990 to help them buy a team that moved to Washington
fifteen years later. Remarkably, New York City actually paid the Yankees $10,000 to play in
Yankee Stadium in 1977 because the stadium lease allowed the team to deduct maintenance
costs from the rent. See Nathan R. Scott, Take Us Back to the Ball Game: The Laws and Policy
ofProfessional Sports Ticket Prices, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 37, 46-48 & nn.61-62 (2005).
10 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
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Second, cities are not required to account for public construction
spending and tax exemptions in the same way as cash. Notably, the
commonly used Tax Increment Financing (TIF) makes large sums of
money available to mayors as an economic development tool that would
allow spending on stadium development, but not allow simple cash
transfers. TIFs allow governments to spend future gains in taxes to
finance current improvements, which will, theoretically, create those
future gains. Note, however, that when these gains fail to materialize,
TIFs are no more than a public to private transfer of wealth. 31 For
example, critics charge that $700 million of the $1.7 billion dollars
spent through TIFs in Chicago in the last eight years went to private
developers, and amounted to "little more than a slush fund for [the
mayor] to subsidize corporate Chicago at the public's expense." 32
Third, many stadium construction projects are financed with tax
exempt municipal bonds. This effectively allows local decision makers
to spend federal money on infrastructure such as stadium building. Thus
subtly, a nontrivial part of the burden of replacing "The House That
Ruth Built" and similar structures will be borne by people who live
thousands of miles away. A 1996 Congressional Research Service
(CRS) report shows that even those stadiums ostensibly built with
private funds receive substantial aid from their tax-exempt bond
status.33 Holding the overall size of government constant, other taxes
have to be higher in compensation because interest payments to holders
of municipal and state bonds are taxed less. The CRS estimated that a
$225 million stadium built in 1996 and financed entirely with tax-
exempt bonds would receive a federal subsidy as great as $75 million
over its life.34 According to the CRS, the federal tax subsidy for sports
31. Note that increases in tax revenues attributable to inflation and demographic shifts can
be used to make TIFs appear more effective than they are in reality.
32. Juan-Pablo Velez, TIF Aided Public and Private Projects Almost Evenly, Analysis
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/us/07cnctif.html?_r-l &pagewanted=allhttp://www.nytime
s.com/2011/08/07/us/07cnctif.html?_r-1&pagewanted=all.
33. When a state sells stadium bonds they pay below market interest rates because the
interest earnings are exempt from federal tax. In most states, bonds issued by a city are exempt
from state taxes as well. Matthew J. Mitten and Bruce W. Burton summarize the findings of the
CRS Report as follows: "[T]he federal government loses millions of dollars in tax revenues
without generating any net economic benefits to the nation as a whole .. .. Moreover, federal
taxpayers' revenue loss usually exceeds the value of stadium bond interest savings to state or
local taxpayers. . . ." Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise
Relocations From Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace
Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REv. 57,
144-45 (1997).
34. See DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS
AND THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS 9-13 & tbl.2 (1996); Adam Safir,
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stadiums was $146 million in 1989 alone.3 5 Moreover, local taxpayers
are left with the responsibility to repay the bonds if (inevitably when)
the stadium fails to generate the expected revenues.
Finally, in the rent-seeking game, complexity is a virtue in itself-
the complexity of stadium financing enables the public choice dynamic
by obscuring the true net cost. The ambiguous cost of subsidies, loan
guarantees, tax breaks, and free infrastructure can be difficult to
calculate, as are the offsetting gains. Thus, byzantine mechanisms of
stadium funding are far less accountable than cash-and far more
attractive to politicians.
The problem with the subsidies is not that stadiums confer no
benefit on the community; the problem is that benefits are apparent
whereas many costs are hidden. What is needed when evaluating
infrastructure projects is not "benefit analysis," however, but "cost-
benefit analysis." It is not enough to point out that a new stadium will
have some positive spillovers; a coherent argument that a stadium
merits subsidy requires evidence both that the positive spillovers
outweigh negative ones and that the net is what James Buchanan and
William Craig Stubblebine have branded a "relevant externality."3 6 The
willingness of English soccer teams to finance their own stadium
construction and renovation demonstrates that such projects create
substantial private benefits and thus do not require public aid. If the
private benefits of a new stadium exceed the private cost, then no public
subsidy is required regardless of any positive spillovers that might
accrue. To illustrate, a home owner who plants a garden for her own
enjoyment may confer benefits upon those who look at it, she may even
increase the value of surrounding property, but if her private incentives
were sufficient to plant the garden without public subsidy, the
externality is positive in total but nonexistent at the margin.37
The empirical literature overwhelmingly concludes that the long-
term public cost of stadium construction overshadows the public
benefits. 38 Public funds ploughed into new and rejuvenated stadiums
typically are justified as conferring gains to city reputation, prestige,
Note, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Politics of Financing Sports Stadium Construction,
13 J.L. & POL. 937, 941 (1997).
35. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 34, at 7. For the public choice implications of the complexity
of stadium financing, see infra Section II.A and accompanying text.
36. See James M. Buchanan & Win. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONoMICA 371,
373-84 (1962).
37. See David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst, 19 J. INTERDISC. EcoN. 3, 8-11
(2007).
38. See generally SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE EcoNoMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS
AND STADIUMS (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997).
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employment, and tax revenue.39 Promoters assert that the franchise will
enhance "the cultural fabric" of a city in ways that defy empirical
assessment.4 0 The evidence, however, suggests that publicly subsidized
stadiums are not cost-effective job creation tools, nor are they
particularly beneficial in urban redevelopment. 4 1  Further, even
assuming one credits those claims, if a new stadium attracts one of an
arbitrarily limited number of teams, one city's gain is another city's
loss.
Examining new construction that occurred in ten cities between
1958 and 1993, Robert Baade and Allen Sanderson estimated that a new
stadium had either no effect or a negative effect on the city's share of
42
amusement and recreation income. New stadiums draw scant business
from outside local communities.43 Household entertainment demand is
inelastic, so a new stadium mainly displaces local competitors such as
movie theaters and amusement parks. Like an individual, a government
has a budget constraint. Consequently, government money spent on
stadiums diverts economic development from other forms of
infrastructure toward labor-intensive, low wage, part-time jobs, such as
staffing the parking lot or concession stands on game days.44 Money
spent on stadiums with dubious spillovers is diverted from education,
public health, public safety, and infrastructure with undeniable positive
spillovers. 4 5 Thus, stadium-building simply transfers wealth from a
plethora of politically less favored industries whose aggregate loss
exceeds the gain realized by the single favored one.
39. See Benjamin A. Okner, Subsidies of Stadiums and Arenas, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESS 325, 327-29 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974).
40. Dean V. Baim, The Rational Behavior Behind NFL Relocations, 30 U. TOL. L. REV.
443, 450-51 (1999).
41. See generally Noll & Zimbalist eds., supra note 38.
42. See Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, The Employment Effect of Teams and
Sports Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES, supra note 38, at 92; ROBERT A. BAADE,
HEARTLAND INST. POL'Y STUDY No. 13, Is THERE AN ECONoMIC RATIONALE FOR SUBSIDIZING
SPORTS STADIUMS? 18-19 (1987) (concluding that stadiums do not create jobs; instead, jobs are
"diverted from the manufacturing economy to the service economy, or from higher-skilled to
lower-skilled (and lower-paid) occupations")
43. See Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 13, at 105-06 (discussing substitution in public
spending); see also Safir, supra note 34, at 953 (noting that in St. Louis, San Francisco, and
Washington, D.C., stadiums probably had a negative effect on per-capita income).
44. See Safir, supra note 34, at 953; see also, Andrew H. Goodman, The Public Financing
of Professional Sports Stadiums: Policy and Practice, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 201 (2002)
("Opportunity costs associated with a community's decision to build a stadium arise as scarce
tax dollars, earmarked for stadium financing, are precluded from funding other public
programs.").
45. See Brad R. Humphreys, The Economic Impact of Sporting Facilities, in HANDBOOK
ON THE EcoNoMICS OF SPORT 214, 217-18 (Wladimir Andreff & Stefan Szymanski eds., 2006).
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Apart from opportunity cost, public underwriting of sporting
facilities is demonstrably a very expensive tool of job creation. The new
stadium used to draw the original Browns from Cleveland to become
the Baltimore Ravens cost Maryland taxpayers $200 million in 1998.46
Supporters claimed that 1,394 full-time jobs would materialize. 47 That
comes to a cost of $127,000 per job,48 but it takes a good while for most
employees to aggregate that sum in their paychecks. Moreover, even
when the initial figures can be formulated in a way that make them look
positive, new stadiums are without exception plagued by construction
49problems and cost overruns.
Public subsidies do not just enrich wealthy sporting franchises, they
also inure to the benefit of wealthy athletes. Teams often argue that they
cannot attract the talent they need to compete in the league without
taxpayer support, given the astronomical salaries today's players
demand. The argument may sometimes have merit vis-A-vis an
individual small-market team, but that is because it describes a
prisoner's dilemma. If all other teams are able to pay astronomical
salaries because they receive taxpayer support, one team will have
tremendous difficulty securing comparable talent unless it follows suit.
If none of the teams received taxpayer support, however, the salaries
would not be so astronomical.
The vast bulk of the paycheck of virtually every top tier professional
athlete represents economic rent-a payment for services over and
above the incentive required for its production.50 The average annual
salary of a player in the NBA exceeds $5 million; in the MLB last
season it was more than $3 million; in the NHL it is $2.4 million; in the
NFL, $1.9 million.5! Those amounts do not include income from
endorsements, public appearances, and the like, which for star athletes
46. Keating, supra note 13, at 15 tbl.1.
47. Goodman, supra note 44, at 205-06.
48. Id. at 206.
49. Prospective assessments of the economic contribution of new stadiums by consultants
employed by the teams and leagues are invariably positive: "Every proposed facility will pump
millions of new dollars of spending into the local economy during the construction period, and
when built will continue to create thousands of new jobs, raise incomes significantly, and enrich
local government coffers with millions of dollars in new tax revenues." Humphreys, supra note
45, at 215 (disparaging, not endorsing such claims). These prospective studies rely on unrealistic
multipliers and overly optimistic cost predictions that are literally never borne out in retrospect.
See id.
50. See Economic Rent Definition, THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF EcoNOMics, available at
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/economic+rent?region=us (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
51. Joe Dorish, Average Salaries in the NBA, NFL, MLB and NHL, YAHOO SPORTS (NOV.
12, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=ycn-10423863. It is true that athletes in
English soccer are also very well paid, but for reasons that are independent of promotion and
relegation.
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usually exceeds the salary component itself. At least as late as the
1970s, less skilled major league baseball players held off-season jobs
such as gas station attendants. 52 As a young prospect, Hall of Famer
Nolan Ryan spent a winter installing air conditioning. 53 Adjusted for
inflation, the minimum major league baseball salary at the time was
$72,000 and the average was $175,000, which is to say substantially
less than a fair number of upper end professorial salaries.5 4 Yet Ryan
was unlikely to become a college professor and he and others toiled on
in their dual baseball player-gas station attendant profession.
Imagine what would happen if every player's salary was cut in half.
How many of those athletes would quit playing and seek alternative
employment? Some marginal players who earn well below the average
would decide they had superior alternatives, as would some older
players who had stashed away substantial investments. Some immature
players of questionable talent would decide not to make an investment
trying to become a star. The number exiting would be modest however,
and more to the point they would be supporting players, the ones most
easily replaced. Fans hardly recognize the names of "near greats" who
grease the skids for the stars; the stars' exploits are the ones most fans
follow. The point is not that top tier athletes may be overpaid in some
absolute sense. Rather, the point is that public funding of stadium
construction and renovation inflates athletes' salaries without any
corresponding benefit to the public.
Public financing is so entrenched in America that the reader must
imagine that no other way exists to finance modern high-caliber
stadiums. England reveals a different model. Arsenal's recent move
from their home of ninety-three years to a new facility stands in marked
contrast to the American experience. The new Emirates Stadium has a
capacity of 60,361,s5 offering many more fans the chance to see their
team in action than did the 38,500 seats in Highbury Stadium.56 The
Emirates has much in common with New Yankee Stadium: the latter
broke ground less than a month after the former officially opened,
52. See Jim Caple, Take Me Out to the Gas Station, ESPN.COM (Jan. 26, 2011),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=caple/ 10126_MLB secondjobs&sportCat=
mlb.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Emirates Stadium, THESTADIUMGUIDE, http://www.stadiumguide.com/emirates (last
visited Sept. 15, 2012).
56. Highbury (Arsenal Stadium), THESTADIUMGUIDE, http://www.stadiumguide.com/high
bury (last vistied Sept. 15, 2012).
57. Emirates Stadium opened on July 23, 2006, Emirates Stadium, supra note 55, while
New Yankee Stadium broke ground on August 16, 2006, New Yankee Stadium,
BALLPARKS.COM, http://www.baliparks.com/baseball/american/nyybpk.htm (last vistied Sept.
152013]1
HeinOnline  -- 65 Fla. L. Rev. 15 2013
Arsenal and the Yankees are both wealthy, privately owned franchises
based in world-class cities, and the two stadiums were designed by the
same leading architectural firm.59 In stark contrast to its American
counterpart, however, the Emirates was completed ahead of schedule
and on budget, was built without public financing, and included other
facilities for public use.60
Exceptionally knowledgeable readers may think we have overstated
our argument because English taxpayers have demonstrably funded
some construction and renovation of professional stadiums.
Government ownership is modest by U.S. standards, however-the
local council has title or leasehold on twenty-one of the 116 stadiums
used in the top five tiers of the English soccer pyramid, and council
ownership becomes more common moving down the tiers. No higher
tier has as many of its teams playing in council-owned stadiums as the
fifth tier Conference's one-quarter. This season, only two Premier
League teams-Manchester City and Swansea-use government
stadiums, and Swansea's was funded by a 355,000 square foot retail
park built as part of the project.61 Second tier West Ham is notable as
well for the fine government-built stadium it will occupy in 2014, an
acquisition that required defeating Tottenham Hotspur in Whitehall
rather than on the playing field.62
15, 2012).
58. Andrew Allen, Forbes Rate Arsenal as 7th Most Valuable Sports Franchise in World,
ARSEBLOG (Jul. 14, 2011, 11:21 AM), http://news.arseblog.com/2011/07/forbes-rate-arsenal-as-
7th-most-valuable-sports-franchise-in-world.
59. Both were designed by Populous, formerly known as HOK Sport Venue Event. See A
Modern Classic: Yankee Stadium, POPULous, http://portfolio.populous.com/showcase/yankeesta
dium.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012); Europe's Most Successful Football Stadium: Emirates
Stadium, POPULOUS, http://portfolio.populous.com/projects/emirates.html (last visited Aug. 30,
2012).
60. See Emirates Stadium Completed Early, SIR-ROBERT-McALPINE.COM (Jul. 24, 2006),
http://www.sir-robert-mcalpine.com/news/?page=4&id=1606. Arsenal used the odd comers of
its new property to construct housing for sale. Rather than remaining empty except on game
days, as most areas surrounding American stadiums do, Brighton and Hove Albion's new
stadium includes bars, clubs, convention facilities, a daycare center, and instructional space for
the University of Brighton. See Hire Emirates Stadium, ARSENAL.COM (Aug. 4, 2007),
http://www.arsenal.com/membership/special-offers/hire-emirates-stadium. In instances when
the United Kingdom provides public financing, typically for smaller and less profitable teams, a
widened public access is a common condition. The national government dispenses most public
stadium construction funds, such as they are, bypassing intercity competition for team
representation.
61. RobertT, Swansea's Development, forum post at http://thetownend.com/index
.php?topic=8036.0;wap2 (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
62. For commercial and legal reasons, it is currently unclear whether West Ham will
actually move to the Olympic Stadium. See David Gold, West Ham United Refusing to Commit
Themselves to Olympic Stadium Move, INSIDE THE GAMEs (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.insidethe
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Subtly, however, the stadiums of Manchester City and West Ham as
well as the temporary home of fourth tier Rotherham United support
this Article's argument. All three structures resulted from competition
among nations for international athletic events-the 2002
Commonwealth Games (Manchester City), the 2012 Olympics (West
Ham), and the 1991 World Student Games (Rotherham United).
Organizers of these events make the same sort of demands on aspiring
nations as American leagues make on cities and states-if Great Britain
wanted to be host, lavish facilities were required. Even the most ardent
critic of government stadium funding would agree that after an event
like the Olympics has concluded, the facilities should be used for some
compatible purpose.
In addition to those three examples, over the past fifteen years the
British government has allocated significant funds to renovate stadiums
not just in England but throughout Great Britain.63 To see the
compatibility with our argument, the reader must understand the
Hillsborough tragedy. At one time, only a minority of fans at soccer
matches had a seat; the majority stood in areas known as terraces that
inclined toward the pitch to afford a better view over fans farther down.
Terraces still provide the majority of capacity in lower tier stadiums.
During the early minutes of a 1989 cup semifinal at Sheffield
Wednesday's Hillsborough Stadium, overcrowding at the top of a
terrace by late-arriving fans crushed fans at the bottom against a fence
that was intended to prevent field invasions, but inadvertently barred
escape. Ninety-six died. That event followed a similar one in 1981 that
injured thirty-eight fans. Such human landslides would be unlikely if
fans had seats.
The British government responded by banning terraces in the
pyramid's upper tiers, a time-consuming conversion that is still ongoing
65as additional teams are promoted. A standing fan occupies less space
than a seated one, however, so banning terraces has diminished the
number of tickets for sale. All-seater stadiums also deprive fans of a
sense of camaraderie that many had enjoyed.66 These renovations were
games.biz/olympics/summer-olympics/2012/15521 -west-ham-united-refusing-to-commit-themsel
ves-to-olympic-stadium-move.
63. Kevin Hollett, Raising the Roof Raising Questions: BC Place Stadium renovations
and the cost to taxpayers, MEGAPHONE (Sept. 30, 10:27 AM) http://megaphonemagazine.com/
magazine/31 0/raising-the-roof-raising-questions-bc-place-stadium-renovations-and-the-cost-to-
taxpayers (last visited Dec. 1, 2011).
64. LORD JUSTICE TAYLOR, THE HILLSBOROUGH STADIUM DISASTER: INQUIRY By THE RT
HoN LORD JUSTICE TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT 12, paras. 61-64 (1989).
65. See ANTHONY KING, THE END OF THE TERRACES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENGLISH
FOOTBALL IN THE 1990s 100-03 (Leicester University Press 2002) (1998).
66. See e.g., MICHAEL CRICK, THE BOSS: THE MANY SIDES OF ALEX FERGUSON 360
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compelled by the state and only reluctantly accepted by most clubs.
Distinguishing most British government stadium investments from
the result of coercive rent-seeking by American teams is uncomplicated:
first, improving fan safety rather than improving club profitability is the
British motive; second, many government investments result in
renovations that British clubs oppose due to lost seating and diminished
fan enthusiasm. Moreover, well-heeled clubs bear the expense
themselves, though clubs in financial distress often receive aid when
undertaking mandated renovations. National funding characterizes most
British government support, and that level of government lacks the
incentive of cities to encourage teams to move.
In sum, while the billions of dollars spent by American taxpayers on
sporting stadiums are not entirely wasted, they are predominantly a
transfer of wealth from the public at large, not just sports fans, to private
commercial interests. The empirical literature overwhelmingly
concludes that the long-term public cost of stadium construction
outweighs the public benefits. Politicians and stadium boosters are able
to gloss over economic reality because the complexity of stadium
financing obscures the true cost to the public. Even though stadium
construction may have public benefits, the English experience shows
that private incentives get new stadiums built when the benefit exceeds
the cost. The next Part examines the underlying causes of the stadium
rent-seeking phenomenon and highlight the consequences of divergence
between the closed system of American leagues with the freedom of
entry created by a promotion and relegation system.
II. CAUSES
The extraordinary leverage that teams hold over American cities is a
product of strong demand, limited supply, closed entry, and the ability
to make credible threats to move. As this Part explains, the strong
demand driven by intense public interest in sports and the fallibility of
local political systems are necessary preconditions. However, as those
are common factors in England and America, they cannot provide an
explanation of the prevalence of a form of rent-seeking in America that
remains muted across the pond. Some commentators focus on
"franchise free-agency" or team freedom of movement as the root cause
of stadium rent-seeking, but that analysis confuses cause and effect.
English soccer teams are also free to move but, as their host city stands
to lose relatively little, little can be gained by threatening. The
foundation of the problem is the cartelization of American leagues.
(Pocket Books) (2003).
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A. Demand
The root cause of unproductive stadium rent-seeking is usually
ascribed to an irrational public demand or a dysfunctional political
system, or some combination of the two.6 7 Both are accurate, but
incomplete.
The former suggests excessive attachment to sports, leading
taxpayers to tolerate large transfers to maintain or gain local league
representation. Though the demand for local representation in top tier
leagues appears to be quite inelastic, that is also true in the United
Kingdom and cannot account for the difference. The latter argument
takes two forms: either shortsighted municipal leadership-that is,
incompetence-or else standard public choice theory-groups that have
a focused interest exploiting a skewed political system against a public
that has diffused interests. Like the irrational demand argument, the
political explanation certainly captures some aspects of stadium rent-
seeking, but it also fails to explain English and American differences.
For a local politician, facilitating publicly financed stadium
renovation or construction offers immediate and extraordinary benefits.
Strong civic interest in retaining or obtaining a team means that press
reports on a politician's effort (or lack of effort) will be extensive and
exhaustive. Political elites' ability to dispense construction contracts
selectively provides them with an additional and less well-reported
benefit.68 Much of the cost of renovation or new construction, in
contrast, falls well into the future on people who are in a poor position
to predict their individual burdens.
In effect, a team's ability to offer a move to a new city, and a
simultaneous threat to leave their host, benefits not just the team but
also city officials. By receiving an offer or threat, politicians gain a
derived offer or threat to forward to their electorate. 69 The threats
regarding public stadium finance are aimed at a broad general public,
and doubtless would incite retribution at the polls if issuing directly
from city officials. Without risking adverse political outcomes,
politically skillful city officials turn threats from unelected team
67. See SARAH WILHELM, CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y & ADMIN., THE UNIV. OF UTAH, PUBLIC
FUNDING OF SPORTS STADIUMs 2, 8-9 (2008), available at http://cppa.utah.edu/_documents/publ
ications/finance-tax/sports-stadiums.pdf.
68. See David R. Herwitz, Accounting for Long-Term Construction Contracts: A
Lawyer's Approach, 70 HARV. L. REV. 449, 455-56 & nn.20-21 (1957) (explaining how the
clever timing of contracts can be used to shift or eliminate tax burdens).
69. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 117 (1987) (discussing the benefits accruing to
politicians from their ability to threaten to withhold or withdraw benefits from small and
coalesced interest groups).
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management to their benefit by adopting the role of savior.
Though public choice theory is useful for understanding the
problem, it is incomplete for two reasons. First, it explains too little:
many rent-seekers have the ear of politicians, combining the clout of
wealth with the political advantage of broadly dispersed costs and
concentrated benefits,o yet local governments are particularly
responsive to the demands of professional sports teams. Consider
Cincinnati's Hamilton County, Ohio, which assumed more than $1
billion in debt to pay for one stadium for baseball and another for
football, and in consequence was forced to roll back a property-tax
break when (surprise!) the two projects soared way over their initial
budgets.7'
Second, the public choice story explains too much: the political
advantage described applies also to British politicians, who are also
elected under a single-member district plurality electoral system, yet
there the practice is rare.72 An explanation for the divergence is
required. Pointing simply to "cultural differences" seems unsatisfactory
given apparent cultural similarities across much of the English-speaking
world. At any rate, as our comparison below between professional and
collegiate football stadiums within the United States shows, the
"cultural differences" thesis is unsupported by the evidence. 73
The previously mentioned opacity of infrastructure financing also
contributes to the public choice dynamic. 74 Residents of Chicago know
that the Bears and White Sox play in subsidized stadiums, but few of
70. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
MARKETS 98-102 (1981) (providing a taxonomy of demand and supply for legislation based on
the extent to which both costs and benefits are distributed or concentrated); JAMES Q. WILSON,
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 333-34 (1973) (examining the extent of interest group activity based
on the distribution of costs and benefits).
71. Reed Albertgotti & Cameron McWhirter, A Stadium's Costly Legacy Throws
Taxpayers for a Loss, WALL ST. J., Jul. 12, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10
001424052748704461304576216330349497852.html.
72. See generally Calvin Jones, A Level Playing Field? Sports Stadium Infrastructure and
Urban Development in the United Kingdom, 33 ENv'T & PLAN. 845 (2001).
73. See infra Section II.D.
74. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
75. The Illinois legislature approved a $432 million contribution to rebuild Soldier Field
for the Chicago Bears. "Chicago-area taxpayers will be paying off the debt for more than thirty
years, at a total cost of $1.3 billion." Scott, supra note 30, at 46; Marc Edelman, How to Curb
Professional Sports' Bargaining Power vis-ti-vis the American City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
280, 281 (2003). In the face of the team's threat to relocate to the Tampa SMSA, Illinois voters
authorized a $60 million stadium subsidy to the Chicago White Sox. Under the final bonding
provision, however, the team actually received $150 million. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional
Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND.
L.J. 25, 25 & n.3 (1991).
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us realize that we also support facilities across the nation for both major
and minor league teams. Our stadiums certainly are a bargain for the
teams and players, while taxpayers outside Chicago cannot spare the
time to pay much attention to Chicago, so few of them even recognize
the load they are bearing. Even the knowledgeable few can ill afford to
do anything about it. In other words, much of the weight falls on
taxpayers who are rationally ignorant and rationally apathetic because
individually their contributions are small (though sizable when
aggregated across them).
Even fully informed Chicago sports fans might be happy to have the
new stadiums, considering that foregoing the local construction would
have led to no reciprocity elsewhere in the nation, but we bear the
burden in reflection. We pay only part of the cost of local stadium
construction but simultaneously bear part of the burden for a plethora of
publically financed stadiums across the nation, the vast majority of
which we will never enter. What could seem a bargain under a local
focus morphs into a bald-faced swindle under a national focus-another
prisoner's dilemma, now facing the voters.
The U.S. federated structure may exacerbate rent-seeking behavior,
but it does not cause it; without the cartelizing effects created by closed
entry and franchise free agency discussed below, the stadium rent-
seeking we observe in the United States is unlikely to occur in the
United Kingdom As such, the fact that U.S. political structure
encourages rent-seeking behavior is a reason to be more attentive to the
possibility of promotion and relegation as a solution.
B. Supply
1. The Closed American Sports System
Because a team cannot join the National Football League, Major
League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the National
Hockey League, nor even (the perversely named) Major League Soccer
without permission of the existing members, incumbent American
franchises determine their own competition, while English teams do not.
Teams have an obvious interest in restricting entry if they can. If the
initial teams in a league were placed in the best locales, being selected
sequentially from the most attractive option on down, once a minimum
threshold is reached, increasing league size should increase total
revenue but reduce average revenue. That makes incumbents hostile
toward new contestants unless and until an aspirant demonstrates an
ability to enter the industry without permission.
76. See Noll, supra note 11, at 176-77.
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New teams refused entry into the existing league could form their
own league, but that poses a much less serious challenge in sports than
in other industries. An investor can risk his capital founding a new
bakery without any agreement with other bakeries, existing or potential,
but an investor cannot form a successful insurgent sports team unless a
number of other investors take the same risk at the same time. Consider
the difficulty Volkswagen would have had entering the U.S. market in
competition with the domestic incumbents had it been necessary to
persuade Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Fiat, and Volvo to take the leap the
exact same year. Volkswagen did not have to play against another
entrant to be successful, but a new team unwelcomed by the incumbents
will fail if the owner cannot persuade other investors to form its playing
competition. A single enterprise acting alone cannot produce the sports
product; there have to be other teams to compete against.
Many rival leagues tried to enter American professional major
league sports during the twentieth century, but only the American
Baseball League and American Football League (AFL) saw their entire
collection of teams survive. To be sure, the incumbents occasionally
take in a few strong teams from insurgent leagues (for example, the
original Cleveland Browns, Indiana Pacers, and Edmonton Oilers), but a
good part of the attraction of admitting those teams into the existing
league was to precipitate or hasten the insurgent league's demise.77
The survival of the American Football League was especially
noteworthy considering the measures the NFL took to impede it. During
the 1950s, the NFL had two teams in Chicago, though the Bears
overshadowed the Cardinals. Dallas businessman Lamar Hunt
attempted unsuccessfully to buy the Cardinals and move the team to his
hometown.78 The NFL then rebuffed Hunt when he asked for a Dallas
expansion franchise. 79 As a third attempt, during 1959, Hunt joined with
other investors to form the AFL, with the Dallas Texans to be his
franchise.80 The new league announced a 1960 inaugural season.
Before the AFL could even get off the ground, the NFL authorized
the Cardinals to move to St. Louis for the 1959 season. St. Louis had
lacked a professional football team and thus had been an attractive
target for the new league. The AFL forged ahead nonetheless, but,
before it could commence its inaugural season, the NFL lured its
77. The NHL expansion in the late 1960s and early 1970s was driven, at least in part, by
the desire to prevent rival leagues forming or transitioning from minor league status. See Seattle
Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. NHL, 783 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986).
78. ED GRUVER, THE AMERICAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE: A YEAR-BY-YEAR HISTORY, 1960-
1969 13 (1997).
79. See id.
80. Id. at 14.
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Minnesota franchise away as an NFL expansion team. The defection of
Minnesota forced the upstart league to put together another group of
investors in short order or begin play with only seven teams, which
would have left one team idle each week throughout the season." The
NFL also had a sudden change of heart regarding expansion. Rather
than awarding an expansion team to Hunt, however, the league inserted
a competitor into Dallas. 82 The Texans and the Cowboys both began
play in 1960, but after three seasons the Texans moved to Kansas City
and became the Chiefs. The AFL filed an antitrust suit against their
rival, but it was unsuccessful. 83
2. Freedom of Entry through Promotion and Relegation
Although deeply rooted in America, the closed nature of sporting
leagues is not normal by international standards. As in most of the
world, in England, teams do not play year-in and year-out against the
81. The Kansas Vikings, MINNESOTA VIKINGS TEAM HISTORY, http://www.kansas
viking.com/history.html (last updated Jan. 3, 2012). The Oakland Raiders, who actually played
in San Francisco their first two seasons, were that hastily organized franchise. The Raiders won
only nine of their first forty-two games, the poorest performance by any of the AFL's founding
teams. Assuming one is not asking for a reference to the necessity of one idle team in an odd-
number league, check http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_ FootballLeague and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oakland-raiders.
82. Joe McGruff, KC Sports Institution Started After NFL Snubbed Hunt, KAN. CITY
STAR, Aug. 8, 1982. The NFL also announced plans for an expansion franchise in Houston but
never followed through with the threat. Id.
83. Am. Football League v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60, 80 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124
(4th Cir. 1963). The NFL reaction to the AFL resembled its earlier and successful effort to
thwart the All American Football Conference, from which it extracted the original Cleveland
Browns, the San Francisco 49ers, and a Baltimore team that promptly failed. For similar
instances regarding baseball, consider the Pacific Coast League's (PCL) mid-1950s major
league aspirations and the aborted formation of the Continental League. Six of the eight PCL
teams played in SMSAs that today host an identical number of major league teams. The PCL
teams were not promoted, however, but were displaced either by existing teams that moved to
the coast (Dodgers, Giants, and Athletics) or by expansion teams that bought their way into
MLB (Angels, Padres, and Seattle Pilots). Two separate teams bought their way into the Seattle
market-after local government ignored their stadium complaints, the Pilots moved to become
the Milwaukee Brewers two years after the Braves had moved to Atlanta; eight years later,
another expansion team, the Mariners, formed to occupy the Kingdome after a repentant local
government built it. The two remaining PCL teams played in Sacramento and Portland, large
cities that today host major league basketball teams, and no doubt would host baseball teams
with serious major league ambitions if promotion and relegation were an American practice. All
of the displaced PCL teams moved to smaller markets, displacing lower tier minor league teams
in the process. Because New York City had lost two of its three teams to California, William
Shea, thinking to fill that void, convened other entrepreneurs with an intention to form the
Continental League. Unfortunately for Shea and his colleagues, at that time baseball's reserve
clause gave indefinite title to a player's baseball playing services to whichever team owned his
contract. The new league could not acquire enough top tier players even to begin play.
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same opponents, but instead rely on promotion and relegation to ensure
parity within a season. The English football structure is distinguishable
from the American in all the ways discussed above, but importantly it is
also distinguishable from the structure across the world because it
promotes and relegates teams across an incredible twenty-three tiers. No
other country has such a deep system of promotion and relegation.
Scotland, for instance, practices promotion and relegation across only
four tiers, admitting additional teams only when an incumbent becomes
insolvent (for example, Gretna in 2008), while Italy and Spain each
maintain the practice across ten tiers.
Thus the English and American leagues are best viewed as opposite
ends of a continuum of openness rather than a binary choice between
open and closed competition. The lower tiers of the English pyramid are
mainly recreational, company, social club, pub, and church teams, but
promotion and relegation links them automatically step by step to the
elite tiers. Each team in the lower tiers is endowed with the potential to
improve and progress, perhaps even to the Premier League (for
example, Wigan Athletic FC84) without requesting permission from the
teams at the top.
That English leagues do not control entry into the pyramid is
crucial; that function lies in the hands of an older and more
comprehensive organization known as the Football Association (FA).
The FA governs all the teams in the pyramid, amateur and part-time
semiprofessional teams as well as the full-time professional clubs, and
is older, distinct from, and independent of any league. Upon formal
application, the Football Association will assign any individual or group
that can finance the formation of a team of any skill level to the tier the
FA judges appropriate. Following its assignment by the FA, a team
finds its suitable level through promotion and relegation. That aspect of
the system is crucial to its success because no permanent harm occurs if
the FA's initial assignment is wrong-a team placed too high will fall, a
team placed too low will rise. Consequently, the payoff for influencing
the FA's allocation decision is small, and in the long run irrelevant.
Would the adoption of promotion and relegation work in North
America? One objection to this proposal is that it would decrease
variety in the American leagues. This objection rests on two
84. Wigan bounced around in the lower tiers for many decades before entering the
English League in the fourth tier in 1978. They ultimately rose to the Premier League in 2005,
where they have remained since (despite some very close calls). See Latics League Finishing
Positions, WIGAN ATHLETICS (Feb. 15, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.wiganlatics.co.uk/club/
history/history-finishingpositions.aspx.
85. The absence of serious attempts to influence initial FA assignments is analogous to
the dog that did not bark.
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misconceptions. First, promotion and relegation is not incompatible
with the features of American sports that improve variety, such as salary
caps, the draft of players from lower to higher tiers, and a limited
86
roster. Putting aside player transition from collegiate to professional
that is important in the NFL and NBA, it is not immediately apparent
how a lower tier to higher tier draft of professional baseball and ice
hockey players could be made compatible with a potential-entry-
preserving promotion and relegation system-which hardly means an
imaginative innovator could not design one. American leagues could
retain the other two rules seamlessly, however, even after implementing
promotion and relegation.
Most importantly, American league salary caps are compatible with
promotion and relegation. Thus salary caps, particularly the extent to
which they prevent a semi-permanent dominance by a few top teams,
are tangential. Despite salary caps, notable dominance of a few teams is
also observed in many American competitions. To educate an ignorant
American for cxample, a European sports fan may liken a team such as
Manchester United, Bayern Munich, or Juventus to "the New York
Yankees of [its league]."
In much of the world, only a team's bank account limits its wage
bill and roster. Though rules define the number of players on the field
during any one game, the group of players under contract from which to
select that limited number has historically been undefined. In
consequence, a few wealthy teams have such large rosters that an elite
world-class player such as David Beckham might spend a season as a
87
substitute (as he did, albeit on Real Madrid's bench in Spain). Not
only are those rules independent of the promotion and relegation
system, they lie beyond the topic here.
The second misconception is that year-to-year volatility within
American major leagues swamps that of the Premier League. Unlimited
player rosters, the absence of a salary cap, and the additional financial
rewards of playing in Europe confer significant advantages on the top
86. Nor are these features uniformly implemented in American sports. Major League
Baseball, for example, has a luxury tax instead of a salary cap. See Baseball Luxury Tax, STEVE
THE UMP, http://www.stevetheump.comluxurytax.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). The NHL
now has a salary floor as well as a cap. See Greg Wyshynski, The war over the NHL 's salary
cap floor, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 6, 2010, 10:50 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nhllblog/
puck daddy/post/the-war-over-the-nhls-salary-cap-floor?urn=nhl,wp 11924.
87. English Premier League teams are now subject to a roster restriction of sorts: at the
end of each semi-annual transfer window, each club is limited to twenty-five players over the
age of twenty-one, at least eight of whom must be "home-grown" as defined by the rules. Jeff
Rusnak, New Roster Rules to Test Premier League Market, SUNSENTINEL.COM (Aug. 14, 2010),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-08-14/sports/fl-soccer-rusnak-0815-20100814_1_manche
ster-city-richard-scudamore-brazil-striker-robinho.
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English teams.8 8 However, these advantages are not intrinsic to
promotion and relegation. Moreover, a more careful analysis shows that
the entry opportunity allowed by promotion and relegation in English
football is more than theoretical: there is significant movement of teams
among the tiers, including teams moving in just a few years from the
Premier League all the way down to competition with semiprofessional
teams, with other teams replacing them from below.
Some observers claim that year-to-year volatility within American
major leagues swamps that in England, reflected not only in a small
number of semipermanent elite Premier League teams but in illusory
movement between tiers as well.8 9 The teams in the upper part of the
top tier seem to be the same this season as last. Promoted teams often
were relegated just a year or two earlier-they are called "poppers":
they pop up a tier one season, pop down a tier the next, pop up a tier
soon after, and so on. Indeed, there do seem to be a few teams that
rarely play out of the top tier, and a few poppers as well.90 Even if the
assertion adequately characterized, say, three-quarters of the teams, it
would not alter our argument-economics works at the margin. There is
potential competition if there is room for even a few invaders of the top
table.
As a matter of fact and as we show below, the prior paragraph's
claim is untrue, at least for England. For example, Leeds United won
the Premier League in 1991-1992, having regained Premier League
status only two years earlier.91 Leeds were then relegated in 2004, and
subsequently relegated again from the second to the third tier in 2007.92
At the other end of the scale, the richest team in the League, Manchester
United, who many Americans imagine to be perennial favorites, were
relegated in 1974, and were in danger of relegation again in 1986 until
88. UEFA recently adopted a European wide policy of "financial fair play" that operates,
broadly speaking, like a salary cap. The policy will take effect in 2013. See UEFA, UEFA CLUB
LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS (2010), available at http://www.uefa.com/
MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/01/50/09/12/1500912_DOWNLOAD.pdf.
89. See SIMON KUPER & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, SOCCERNOMICs: WHY ENGLAND LOSES,
WHY GERMANY AND BRAZIL WIN, AND WHY THE US, JAPAN, TURKEY-AND EVEN IRAQ-ARE
DESTINED TO BECOME THE KINGS OF THE WORLD'S MOST POPULAR SPORT 167-69 (2009)
(arguing that the volatility is actually more similar than perceived).
90. All three teams promoted to the top tier for the 2011-12 season - Swansea, Norwich,
and Queens Park - avoided relegation after finishing 11th, 12th, and 17th in the twenty-team
Premier League. Of the three teams relegated that season, only West Ham popped immediately
back up, and that by winning a four-team playoff for the final of the three promotion spots.
91. Matthew Balmforth, 'Whatever Happened' to the Leeds United Title Winners of
1992?, FOOTBALLFANCAST, (Sept. 12, 2010, 1:26 PM), http://www.footballfancast.com/2010/
09/football-blogs/whatever-happened-to-the-leeds-united-title-winners-of- 1992.
92. Jim Howlett, Leeds United-From Milan to Yeovil, SOCCERLENS (Nov. 10, 2008),
http://soccerlens.com/leeds-united-from-milan-to-yeovil/1 5752.
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Sir Alex Ferguson was appointed manager.93
The impression of Premier League year-to-year inertia proceeds
from a faulty frame of reference. A good deal of season-to-season
stability is inevitable given the mechanism employed, which relegates
only three teams each year. This year's Premier League must look very
much like last year's regardless of long-run entry potential. Even if no
relegated team subsequently regained Premier League status, it would
take at least seven years for the league to turn over completely.
Inevitably, season-to-season comparisons are misleading.
Table 1 shows the most recent year in which each team from the
recently completed Premier League season last played in the second
tier. Seven teams have remained continuously in the top tier during the
present century, Arsenal since World War I. However, nearly twice that
number-thirteen-spent time in lower tiers during the past decade.
Consider Blackburn, promoted from the second tier in 1992, second in
the Premier League in 1994 and then champion in 1995,94 relegated in
1999, promoted again in 2001, (and now relegated still again for the
2012-13 season)-apparently a popper, but also a champion. Wigan had
never played in the top tier at all before 2005, indeed, had never even
played in the Football League until 1976, but has now retained its spot
in the Premier League for an eighth consecutive season. Two other
teams, Reading and Hull City, reached the top for the first time even
more recently, in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Manchester United,
Tottenham Hotspur, Chelsea, and Newcastle, all world-renowned teams
that have won multiple top tier championships, played in the second tier
as recently as 1975, 1978, 1989, and 2010 respectively. 95
93. Rob Smyth, A Brief History of Manchester United, ESPN.COM (Jul. 1, 2012),
http://soccemet.espn.go.com/feature/lid/841082?cc=5901.
94. Blackburn were runners up the previous year. Matthew Adams, The History of
Blackburn Rovers FC, HELIUM (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.helium.com/items/2238385-the-
history-of-blackburn-rovers-fc.
95. The same applies to the once formidable Sunderland who played in the second tier in
2007.
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Table 1-Most Recent Year Out of the Top Tier
Arsenal (London) 1915
Everton (Liverpool) 1954
Liverpool 1962
Manchester United 1975
Tottenham (London) 1978
Aston Villa (Birmingham) 1988
Chelsea (London) 1989
Fulham (London) 2001
Blackburn 2001
Bolton (Greater Manchester) 2001
Manchester City 2002
Wigan (Greater Manchester) 2005
Sunderland (Tyne and Wear) 2007
Stoke 2008
Wolves (Wolverhampton) 2009
Newcastle (Tyne and Wear) 2010
West Bromwich (Birmingham) 2010
Queens Park (London) 2011
Norwich 2011
Swansea 2011
Table 2 compares the top tier's composition over a longer span,
contrasting top tier teams of 2011-12-the most recent complete
season-with top tier teams twenty years earlier.96
96. At the opening of the 1991-1992 season, the top tier was the Football League First
Division. All First Division teams withdrew in February to form the Premier League, an
independent organization that continues promotion and relegation with the second tier now
known as the Football League Championship. See infra Table 2A.
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Table 2A-The Fate of Top-Tier Teams Across Two Decades
1991-92 First Division 2011-12 Premier League
Arsenal (London) Arsenal (London)
Aston Villa (Birmingham) Aston Villa (Birmingham)
Chelsea (London) Chelsea (London)
Everton (Liverpool) Everton (Liverpool)
Liverpool Liverpool
Manchester City Manchester City
Manchester United Manchester United
Norwich Norwich
Queens Park (London) Queens Park (London)
Tottenham (London) Tottenham (London)
Coventry 2nd Tier
Crystal Palace (London) 2nd Tier
Champion Leeds 2nd Tier
Nottingham Forest 2nd Tier
Southampton 2nd Tier
West Ham (London) 2nd Tier
Notts County (Nottingham) 3rd Tier
Oldham (Greater Manchester) 3rd Tier
Sheffield United 3rd Tier
Sheffield Wednesday 3rd Tier
Wimbledon (London) 3rd Tier
Luton Town 5th Tier
2nd Tier Blackburn
2nd Tier Newcastle (Tyne and Wear)
2nd Tier Sunderland (Tyne and Wear)
2nd Tier Wolves (Wolverhampton)
3rd Tier Bolton (Greater Manchester)
3rd Tier Fulham (London)
3rd Tier Stoke City
3rd Tier Swansea
3rd Tier West Bromwich (Birmingham)
3rd Tier Wigan (Greater Manchester)
When a new locale gains entry into the Premier League the
enterprise is a new entrant. A comparison with the NFL over a similar
timespan is instructive. Other than the Jacksonville Jaguars, Carolina
Panthers, Houston Texans, and the new Cleveland Browns-all of them
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expansion teams admitted after hefty side payments to the incumbent
cartel-the enterprises are precisely the same, though several have
moved to new cities in order to reap rent seeking profits.
Table 2B-The Fate of NFL Teams Across Two Decades
1991 NFL Teams 2011 NFL Teams
Chicago Bears Chicago Bears
Arizona Cardinals Arizona Cardinals
Green Bay Packers Green Bay Packers
New York Giants New York Giants
Detroit Lions Detroit Lions
Washington Redskins Washington Redskins
Pittsburgh Steelers Pittsburgh Steelers
Philadelphia Eagles Philadelphia Eagles
Los Angeles Rams* St. Louis Rams
Cleveland Browns Baltimore Ravens
San Francisco 49ers San Francisco 49ers
Indianapolis Colts Indianapolis Colts
Dallas Cowboys Dallas Cowboys
Minnesota Vikings Minnesota Vikings
Atlanta Falcons Atlanta Falcons
New Orleans Saints New Orleans Saints
Buffalo Bills Buffalo Bills
Miami Dolphins Miami Dolphins
New England Patriots New England Patriots
New York Jets New York Jets
Cincinnati Bengals Cincinnati Bengals
Houston Oilers* Tennessee Titans
Denver Broncos Denver Broncos
Kansas City Chiefs Kansas City Chiefs
Los Angeles Raiders* Oakland Raiders
San Diego Chargers San Diego Chargers
Tampa Bay Buccaneers Tampa Bay Buccaneers
Seattle Seahawks Seattle Seahawks
Jacksonville Jaguars
Carolina Panthers
Cleveland Browns4
Houston Texans
* The Houston Oilers became the Tennessee Titans in 1999; the Rams moved to St.
Louis in 1995; and the Raiders returned to Oakland in 1995.
" The pre-1996 Cleveland Browns became the Baltimore Ravens. Although the NFL
records indicate otherwise, the current Cleveland Browns are a new NFL franchise
established in 1999.
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Leeds won the 1991-1992 championship, but has spent the past
eight seasons out of the Premier League, three of them in the third tier.
Five other top tier teams from 1991-1992 now compete with Leeds in
the second tier, while an additional five compete in the third tier.97 Poor
Luton has fallen all the way to the fifth tier. Thus twelve of the top tier
teams of 1991-1992-more than half-are in lower tiers in 2011-2012,
and most teams in this season's Premier League have spent intervening
seasons relegated to lower tiers. Recently promoted Norwich and
Queens Park each spent fifteen of the intervening twenty years in the
second and third tiers.
The analysis can be more comprehensive still. Including the 2011-
2012 season, the twenty-two First Division teams from 1991-1992 will
have played 220 seasons in aggregate over the past decade. 98 Table 3
shows the distribution of the top 1991-1992 teams across all tiers.
Table 3
Tier 1 97 44.1%
seasons
Tier 2 71 32.3%
seasons
Tier 3 40 18.2%
seasons
Tier 4 9 4.1%
seasons
Tier 5 3 1.4%
seasons
The English Premier League teams experienced no random draw
(that would indeed have been surprising) but neither in aggregate did
they spend even half the recent decade in the top tier. In general, the
Table reveals considerable entry potential.
A second objection to the adoption of promotion and relegation in
North America is that no minor league teams exist that could constitute
meaningful competitors for major league rivals. This is no reason why
promotion and relegation could not work here-rather, it is an
97. The statement takes Milton Keynes to be the continuation of the original Wimbledon.
See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text. If AFC Wimbledon, the team that replaced the
original Wimbledon, is taken as the continuation, Wimbledon would count as a fourth tier team
rather than a third.
98. For the reasons discussed above, the computation excludes the first decade following
the 1991-1992 season to control against the inevitable strong serial correlation imparted by the
three-team-per-year mechanism of promotion and relegation.
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endogenous artifact of the system itself, a product of the impossibility
of entry. If entry into the top tier were a meaningful prospect, there
would be an incentive to develop stronger teams in the tiers below-if
you build it they will come. In promotion and relegation systems, there
always exists at least one other competitive tier of competition, and
usually more.
Although promotion and relegation is alien to the American context,
it is easy to imagine how it could be introduced. Take the NFL, for
example. At season's end the 32 teams could be divided into top and
bottom halves according to won/lost records, creating two 16-team
divisions- a number with which the NFL is very experienced from its
final years of pre-merger competition with the AFL. Because the
number of teams in American leagues is driven not by considerations of
optimal league size for competitive purposes but rather to keep the
number of large but unserved cities too few to permit a competing
league to intrude, the closeness of competition at each level would
actually improve the following season. A third division of 16 expansion
teams could initiate play in a third division with automatic promotion
the incentive for performance. Surely a new Los Angeles based team
would soon be taking turns in the top tier. In time, other tiers that met
the ambitions of entrepreneurs in still smaller cities could be added,
accompanied no doubt by additional teams in cities already represented
in the league.
Promotion and relegation can cause instability because the decline in
revenue associated with relegation can be too steep to support expenses
such as player contracts that were appropriate to the higher tier. The
English Premier League addresses this concern by giving exiting teams
a "parachute payment" over three years while they make necessary
adjustments.99 It is common for player and staff contracts to include an
automatic salary reduction in the event of relegation.' 00 The transition to
promotion and relegation might work differently in sports such as
hockey and baseball which already have strong minor leagues.' 0'
99. Parachute Payments and Their Use by the FA Premier League, IN BRIEF,
http://www.inbrief.co.uk/football-law/premier-league-parachute-payment.htm (last visited Sept.
28, 2012).
100. See id. These contractual provisions can also serve the interests of players. When
West Ham was demoted at the end of the 2010-2011 season, Senegalese striker Demba Ba
invoked a release clause in his contract allowing him to leave as a free agent. Jamie Jackson,
Demba Ba Leaves West Ham and Looks to the Premier League, THEGUARDIAN (Jun. 15, 2011,
3:41 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/20 11/jun/1 5/demba-ba-west-ham-everton.
101. The American Hockey League's Chicago Wolves, for example, carry enough local
support to have a full television package. See Wolves Add 15 Games on My50 Chicago To
Broadcast Slate, CHICAGOWOLVES.COM, http://www.chicagowolves.com/releases/1398-wolves-
add-i 5-games-on-my5O-chicago-to-broadcast-slate (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
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Interest in minor leagues has a ceiling at the moment precisely because
so little is at stake, but if the winners of the top minor league in each
sport were promoted to the majors at the end of the season it would be,
as they say, a whole different ballgame.
In sum, the structure of American sports severely restricts potential
supply for a city that fails to attract or retain one of the incumbent
franchises, a vital component of league leverage for public subsidies.102
In contrast, systems with promotion and relegation limit monopoly
power, allowing individual teams to enter or exit according to team
quality and market demand. That dilutes the power of threats to relocate
because cities have alternatives.
C. Freedom of Movement
1. Franchise Relocation in North America
The term "franchise free agency" became popular in the late 1990s
after both the Rams and Raiders left Los Angeles for better stadium
deals in St. Louis and Oakland.10 3 As the term suggests, the major sports
leagues rarely resist intercity team movement in pursuit of an improved
handout from politicians. Sometimes a league will even broker such a
move.104
Many people doubt that franchise free agency could be responsible
for stadium subsidies for teams like the New York Yankees and the
Chicago Bears. They believe that it is not credible that teams so closely
associated with their city could ever leave.105 The claim that the
Yankees will never leave New York is persuasive only ex ante, and only
if little thought is given to history. Similar claims were made about
baseball's Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Giants until they
simultaneously moved to California, whereupon everyone expressed
great shock. 0 Or, like the football Giants and Jets, a Yankee exit from
102. See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 11, at 626-27.
103. See Professional Sports Franchise Relocation: Antitrust Implications: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 82-112 (1996) (statement of former
NFL Comm'r Paul Tagliabue).
104. Andrew Zimbalist & Roger G. Noll, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: Are New Stadiums
Worth the Cost?, BROOKINGS (1997), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/06/
summer-taxes-noll.
105. This objection has been raised on every occasion that the authors have presented this
Article.
106. The 1957 shift of the New York Giants and Brooklyn Dodgers to California provoked
a bitter and long-lasting reaction that could have threatened the future of the major leagues.
Even though the Dodgers had long threatened to move, the transfer came as a great shock. When
the Dodgers moved west, one fan remembers, "[I]f you were in Behan's Bar and Grill, you'd
have thought it was a wake. This was like seceding from the [U]nion." CHARLES C. EUCHNER,
PLAYING THE FIELD: WHY SPORTS TEAMS MOVE AND CITIES FIGHT To KEEP THEM 17 (1993).
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New York City might merely be across the Hudson River to reap
largess from New Jersey. If the Yankees left New York, it would be
shocking-not because it would be breaking with their traditional home,
as many teams have done this, but because it would be surprising if
New York City broke the trend of governments willing to pay for public
stadiums as a result of such threats. Ex post, the Yankees would be
added to the long list of movers that no longer shocked people.
Franchise relocation is a complicated issue for sports leagues.
Individual franchises have a strong interest in either relocating or
threatening to relocate as a tool to secure support from local
government. NFL teams are particularly mobile because league
members share broadcast revenues equally while each team bears its
own field expenses if it cannot obtain public defrayment. 0' Thus, the
key to improving franchise value is not winning championships but
obtaining a favorable deal regarding rent and items such as concessions,
parking, luxury boxes, and personal seat licenses that are unshared with
other teams.10
107. The $3 billion received by the NFL for its current television contracts are split equally
by the thirty-two teams over the life of the contract. The credibility of the threat arguably
depends on the nature of revenue-sharing arrangements in each league, which does vary. Teams
in the NFL share between 75% and 85% of total league revenues. Until recently, MLB had
almost the opposite balance, with local revenue contributing between 70% and 80% to a typical
team's total revenue. See VINCE GENNARO, DIAMOND DOLLARS: THE ECONOMICS OF WINNING IN
BASEBALL 4 (2007). However, under the relatively recent MLB revenue-sharing scheme, all
thirty teams pay 31% of their local revenues into a common pool to be divided evenly among
them. David Jacobson, MLB 's Revenue-Sharing Formula, CBSMONEYWATCH (Jul. 14, 2008,
3:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505125_162-51210897/mlbs-revenue-sharing-
formula. The NHL has a complex revenue-sharing formula that provides for transfers from the
top ten teams to the bottom fifteen. The NHL implemented the revenue-sharing system after the
lockout that led to the cancellation of the 2004-2005 season. The NBA franchises are apparently
considering dramatically increasing the amount high-revenue teams share with low-revenue
teams from roughly $60 million to about $150 million per season. Henry Abbott, Sources:
Owners Talk Revenue Sharing, ESPN.CoM (Oct. 25, 2011, 9:36 PM),
http://espn.go.com/nba/story//id/7147909/nba-lockout-owners-discussing-revenue-sharing-sou
rces-say. MLS operates under a hybrid single-entity structure. See Fraser v. Major League
Soccer, LLC, 284 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2002). Technically, MLS owns all teams and other
assets; however, the operations of each team are managed by a specific owner-investor. Team
"operators" retain 50% of local ticket sales and concessions, the first $1.25 million of local
broadcast revenues, 100% of overseas tour revenues, and 50% of net revenues from the MLS
championship game. Id. at 54.
108. Except, of course, the Green Bay Packers. Don Nottingham, Keeping the Home Team
at Home: Antitrust and Trademark Law as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports
Franchise Relocation, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 1065, 1069 (2004) ("Unquestionably, it is vital to
the economic health of an NFL franchise-the viability of the franchise as a business, not the
quality of the team on the field-to have a state of the art facility.").
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Although teams often have strong incentives to move, their
colleagues occasionally have an interest in preventing relocation.
Relocation that reduces the national television audience may be
profitable for the team but reduces shared revenue from the television
contract. All of the elite American sporting leagues retain some
discretion over franchise relocation. However, for reasons which are
elaborated in Part III, the leagues either cannot or are unlikely to stand
in the way of opportunistic relocation threats. In fact, one plausible
explanation for the length of time that the NFL has abandoned the
valuable L.A. market is that the "city's main value to the league is as a
threat to hold over cities whose existing teams want new stadiums with
public subsidies."
109
2. Franchise Continuity in England
Promotion and relegation fundamentally alters team incentives to
relocate due to a team's substitutability from the perspective of its
hometown. Attracting public stadium financing is a key business driver
for American franchises. In England, however, the local environment-
population, wealth, sporting interest, and the like-primarily determines
whether there will be a soccer team at a particular level (on average) or
whether the top local team will be promoted to a higher level or
relegated to a lower one.
Every large or moderately sized city in England supports multiple
full-time professional soccer teams-teams playing in the first four tiers
of the pyramid in addition to a majority of the teams playing in the fifth
tier and a handful in even lower tiers. 110 To take just a few examples,
this season sixteen professional soccer teams play inside London's ring
road, five in the Premier League, and an additional eight
semiprofessional teams playing in the sixth tier. Being so numerous,
most teams bear neighborhood names such as Chelsea, Fulham, Leyton,
Tottenham, or West Ham, and none calls itself London. Greater
Manchester, a governmental unit with a border roughly encircling the
city center about fifteen miles out and a population comparable to the
Tampa SMSA, hosts four Premier League teams and an additional eight
teams that play in the lower tiers through the sixth tier. Even relatively
small Blackpool finds five professional teams playing in various tiers
within twenty miles of its city center. Additional semiprofessional and
109. Tim Rutten, Op-Ed., Protecting L.A. 's Pocket, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, available at
http://articles.1atimes.com/201 1/jan/22/opinionla-oe-rutten-column-football-20110122.
110. In distinction to American practice, nothing bars professional English teams from
playing against semiprofessional or amateur opposition if past performance leads to such a
configuration. Indeed, that sort of intermixed competition occurs many times each season during
tournaments that run simultaneously with league play.
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amateur teams play in even lower tiers, and new promotable teams can
and do materialize when promoters believe conditions are favorable.
Importantly, all are potential substitutes for any local team that threatens
to leave.
Normalized by area or by population, English teams are much
denser than their American counterparts. In the age of rail
transportation, lower English transportation cost, both the explicit ticket
price and the implicit opportunity cost of travel time, accounted for the
dissimilar densities."' That a similar team density per unit population
has not arisen in America in the age of air travel is attributable to the
absence of promotion and relegation. Lower tier teams are also a more
effective substitute in England because revenue coverage is broader
there. A small market English team can survive by achieving occasional
promotions into higher and more lucrative tiers. Even the most
successful minor league team in America will never share the rewards
that the handful of major league teams hold firmly. A minor league
team must survive year in and year out on minor league attendances,
minor league broadcast revenues (if any), and handouts from major
league teams who park young players for experience and then withdraw
them as soon as they mature. In brief, in the eyes of a host city with
aspirations to "major league" status, the very best minor league team
will never seem good enough. Thus, unlike England, American teams
outside the top tier are not potential substitutes for top tier franchises.
In England, substitutes abound. Over time, a lower ranking local
team or a new one will rise to occupy the abandoned niche if a team
were to move elsewhere. No locale needs to mortgage itself for fear of
losing league representation at a level its environment can support. As
evidence, only a single team, Wimbledon, has actually moved to a new
stadium at any substantial distance removed from its original home.
Even then, the distance-fifty-six miles, to Milton Keynes-was trivial
in comparison with the moves American teams undertake.112 A new
111. See Cain & Haddock, supra note 11, at 1127-30 & fig.l.
112. For just a subset of examples from baseball, the Pilots moved nearly 2,000 miles to
become the Milwaukee Brewers two years after Milwaukee lost the Braves to Atlanta, a move
of more than 800 miles. See Milwaukee Brewers and Seattle Pilots, BASEBALL ALMANAC,
http://www.baseball-almanac.com/teams/brewers.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2012); The Story
of the Braves, ATLANTA BRAVES, http://atlanta.braves.mlb.com/atl/history/storyof the
braves.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). The Braves of course had moved nearly 1,100 miles to
get to Milwaukee from Boston in the first place. The Giants moved over 2,900 miles from
Manhattan to San Francisco; the Dodgers moved nearly 2,800 miles from Brooklyn to Los
Angeles; the Expos moved nearly 600 miles from Montreal to become the Washington
Nationals. See Timeline, SAN FRANCISCo GIANTS, http://mlb.mlb.com/sf/history/timeline.jsp
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012); Timeline, Los ANGELES DODGERS, http://losangeles.dodgers
.mlb.com/la/history/timeline.jsp (last visited Sept. 28, 2012); Franchise Timeline, WASHINGTON
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team, AFC Wimbledon, formed in 2002 within weeks of the
announcement of the impending move. The replacement became
operational so promptly that both clubs claimed to represent Wimbledon
for a season. The eighth tier newcomer attracted larger crowds than the
second tier incumbent, which was forced to rely mainly on travelling
fans supporting the opponent. AFC Wimbledon has achieved frequent
promotions and now plays in the fourth tier, from where at the
conclusion of the present season it could conceivably swap places with
the now third tier Milton Keynes. That result might be unsurprising
given that in England the locale's environment rather than the team's
franchise is the limiting variable. Although English teams sometimes
seek public subsidies, they take no retaliatory action when, as
commonly happens, those requests are rejected. There is no credible
threat with which to extort stadium subsidies in a system with
promotion and relegation.
D. The Leverage ofAmerican Sporting Franchises Reconsidered
This Article has argued that the closed cartel structure of American
professional sports enables franchises to coerce frequent and sizable
stadium investments from local government, whereas the open structure
of English professional soccer, coupled with the autonomous governing
authority of the Football Association, goes far to obviate a similar
pressure. Some recent examples of North American stadium subsidies
are illustrative. Since 2001, in the NFL alone, taxpayers have provided
$193 million for Reliant Stadium (Houston Texans), $251 million for
CenturyLink Field (Seattle Seahawks),1 4 $219 million for Ford Field
(Detroit Lions),115  $188 million for Lincoln Financial Field
NATIONALS, http://washington.nationals.mlb.com/was/history/timeline.jsp (last visited Sept. 28,
2012). The Athletics moved over 1,100 miles to their stopover in Kansas City on the way to
Oakland, an additional trek of 1,800 miles. In football, Kansas City was the receiver (pun
intended) as the Texans arrived from Dallas, only 500 miles away, to become the Chiefs. Chiefs
History-1960s, KANSAS CITY CHIEFS, http://www.kcchiefs.com/team/chiefs-history/1 960s.html
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012). The Rams moved over 1,800 miles from Los Angeles to St. Louis,
which had earlier lost the Cardinals to Phoenix, a move of nearly 1500 miles. T.J. Simers, NFL
Owners OK Rams' Move to St. Louis, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-04-13/news/mn-54268 1 rams-owner. However, the Cardinals
had arrived in St. Louis from Chicago, a mere 300 miles away. The Rams are having second
thoughts about leaving Los Angeles, but they could be beaten to the prize if the Jaguars make a
2,400 mile move from Jacksonville before the Rams get packed. Of course, nobody is moving to
Los Angeles unless the city or county puts a proper stadium in place.
113. See Reliant Stadium, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootball.
com/afc/ReliantStadium.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
114. See CenturyLink Field, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootba
ll.com/nfc/CenturyLinkField.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
115. See Ford Field, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootball.com/
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(Philadelphia Eagles),' 1 6  $395 million for Soldier Field (Chicago
Bears)," $285 million for University of Phoenix Stadium (Arizona
Cardinals),' 1 8  $612 million for Lucas Oil Stadium (Indianapolis
Colts),"' and $325 million for Cowboys Stadium (Dallas Cowboys).120
This publically reported total, in excess of $2.4 billion, is a significant
understatement because, as discussed above, much stadium
subsidization comes in opaque forms that are difficult to assess
accurately. 121
To appreciate the scope of the phenomenon, it is instructive to
compare the effects of stadium rent-seeking as manifested in stadium
age. Using stadium age allows us to compare any team in any league.
Figure 1 shows that stadium ages are consistent with our hypothesis,
dramatically so.122
nfc/FordField.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
116. See Lincoln Financial Field, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprof
ootball.com/nfc/LincolnFinancialField.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
117. See Soldier Field, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootball.co
m/nfc/SoldierField.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
118. See University of Phoenix Stadium, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadium
sofprofootball.com/nfc/UniversityofPhoenixStadium.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
119. See Lucas Oil Stadium, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootba
ll.com/afc/LucasOilStadium.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
120. See Cowboys Stadium, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofprofootbal
l.com/nfe/CowboysStadium.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
121. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
122. The figures summarized by STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, supra notes 113-120, do not
appear to incorporate the loss of federal tax dollars due to the tax-exempt status of municipal
bonds. Other sources indicate larger taxpayer expenditures.
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Figure 1 English Premier League and National Football League
Stadiums by Age
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On average, NFL stadiums are nearly twenty-three years old. MLB
stadiums are nearly twenty-two years old. The 2011-12 season's
Premier League stadiums averaged more than seventy-eight years of
age. It is not that English soccer teams are unresponsive to local
changes in population and wealth; rather, they have responded the way
homeowners most often do when family size grows-they have put up
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with a bit of inconvenience until matters have become untenable, then
they have renovated. At zero cost, all teams would prefer brand-new
structures with a bias toward lucrative corporate hospitality suites, but it
is very often substantially cheaper to renovate the old than to demolish
it and start anew. Because English teams, especially the upper tier
teams, usually must pay the bill, they often forego or postpone the
attractive alternative because it is not worth the difference in cost.
Teams in America followed the same practice until enticements
from cities without teams, such as Milwaukee and Kansas City,
revealed the other side of the coin. Moreover, teams quickly realized
that they did not have to wait for a city to identify itself by making the
first move; a threat to move often induces the local government to
contribute a substantial part or all of the cost of a new stadium.123 Even
if the ploy fails, the team has placed itself in play, almost invariably
attracting offers from elsewhere. There is nothing lamentable if natural
scarcity leads to competition among alternative claimants, but as the
English experience reveals, a scarcity of potentially high caliber teams
in America is a product of an artificial cartel, not market forces. It is
notable that lower tier English teams rarely resort to tear-downs, playing
in old but renovated structures instead. The average age of the 2011-
2012 season's second tier stadiums was sixty-four years; the third tier,
seventy-five years; the fourth, sixty-eight years; and the fifth, eighty-
three years. Those ages are similar to, and overlap, the ages of Premier
League stadiums.
Another test contrasts professional and collegiate stadium ages
within the United States, an approach that goes beyond providing
additional data. If we only contrast English with American leagues, the
differences could merely be a product of omitted variables arising from
innate geographical, political, or cultural differences. The collegiate
data allow us to challenge our theory that the relatively closed industrial
organization of American professional sporting teams-specifically,
control over entry and placement of teams-enables the lucrative
stadium rent-seeking that leagues exercise over political units. Colleges
own the teams they host, and the team's fan base consists in important
part of alumni who would jump ship if the team dared leave the
university. Being functionally immobile, collegiate teams lack an
important tool that professional teams possess; they can plead with
alumni to finance stadium improvements, but they cannot threaten to
leave, and thus lack a professional team's leverage over their host.
123. For example, the Chicago White Sox secured a $60 million stadium subsidy by
threatening to move to the Tampa SMSA in 1988. Michael Martinez, White Sox Are Safe at
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 1988, at 45.
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Figure 2 Stadium Age by Competition
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Figure 2 summarizes much of the foregoing discussion. It shows the
average age of sports stadiums in English football and a variety of
American sports. The contrast between the various tiers of English
football on the one hand (black bars) and MLB and NFL on the other
(light gray bars) is striking. The average age of MLB and NFL stadiums
in 2012 was twenty-two and twenty-three years, respectively, well
below the median age of U.S. housing stock, college football stadiums
(gray bars), or English football stadiums. Figure 3 illustrates the same
data in more detail.
At more than sixty-seven years, average stadium age in the major
collegiate conferences-those whose champion qualifies automatically
for the Bowl Championship Series (BCS)-intermingle with the various
tiers of English soccer.124 In college football, three independent teams
and the members of five other conferences compete for a chance to play
in the BCS by meeting specified criteria, though none qualifies
automatically. 12 A number of the latter teams have only recently begun
124. The automatic BCS qualifying conferences are the Atlantic Coast, Big East, Big Ten,
Big 12, Southeastern, and Pac-12. Independent Notre Dame automatically qualifies by meeting
defined criteria. See BCS Automatic Qualification, At-Large Eligibility and Selection
Procedures, 2011-2014 Games, COLLEGEFOOTBALLPOLL, http://www.collegefootballpoll.com/b
cs selection procedures.html (last updated Nov. 25, 2011).
125. They are Conference USA, Mid-American, Mountain West, Sun Belt, and
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playing intercollegiate football or have moved up from lower tiers;
consequently, their stadiums are relatively new. Even with those
stadiums included, the overall average age of top tier collegiate
stadiums is about two-and-one-half times the average age of NFL
stadiums.126 A number of teams that share the relatively new stadium of
an NFL neighbor or a bowl impart a slight downward bias to the
collegiate averages.
Figure 3 shows, in order, the age of every stadium in the Premier
League, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Football,
MLB, and NFL.
Figure 3 Age Distribution of Individual Stadiums
J
Individual Stadiums
English Premier League E= National Footbal League
Major League Baseball NCAAFootball
As seen in Figure 3, a third of major collegiate teams play in
stadiums older than Chicago's Soldier Field, by far the NFL's oldest
stadium at eighty-seven years. However, Illinois taxpayers view Soldier
Field as a new structure-we paid extra in order to retain the old fagade
while building a completel new stadium within (or, depending on
one's perspective, above).12 For all practical purposes, the true age of
Western Athletic, as well as independents Army, Brigham Young, and Navy. Id.
126. On average, collegiate football stadiums are about two-and-one-half times as old as
MLB stadiums as well, and are half again as old as the median U.S. home.
127. Lavishly praised by admiring television sportscasters on the inside, various observers
a
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Soldier Field is eight years. If we count Jacksonville's sixty-five-year-
old field as truly the oldest in the NFL, 12 8 then 60% of major collegiate
teams, including a number of perennial powerhouses, 129 play in
stadiums older than any in the NFL. 130 Clearly, as with English soccer,
there is nothing intrinsic to American football that spoils the usefulness
of a stadium after a mere quarter of a century-sports stadiums easily
outlast residential housing when permitted to do so.
As in England, colleges renovate their stadiums much more often
than they tear them down, as evidenced by (among many potential
examples) Ohio State's recent closure of the open end of its famous
horseshoe with additional seating and Cal's present renovation project.
The same is true for the University of Michigan's "Big House", with
capaci repeatedly expanded from 72,000 in 1927 to 109,901 in
2010.
viewing Soldier Field from the outside have called it "A Flying Saucer Atop a Greek Temple,"
"The Eyesore on the Lake Shore," and several names that ought not be repeated in polite
company.
The new (renovated) Soldier Field's 61,500 seats make it the smallest in the NFL, which
doubtless will be a complaint when the Bears launch their next stadium demand, though what
ultimately materializes may well seat even fewer. Soldier Field, ESPN.coM, http://espn.go.com/
travel/stadium/ /s/nfl/id/3/soldier-field (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). Immediately prior to
reconstruction, Soldier Field could seat 8% more Bears fans, 66,946. Historical Timeline of
Soldier Field, CHICAGO BEARS, http://assets.chicagobears.com/tradition/sftimeline.asp? (last
visited Sept. 28, 2012).
128. Some would argue that Jacksonville's stadium scarcely counts either, given that it was
so extensively renovated in 1995 at a taxpayer cost of $136 million. See Keating, supra note 6,
at 14.
129. A few examples of those powerhouses-Southern Cal, Nebraska, Notre Dame,
Clemson, Auburn, Texas, Louisiana State, Oklahoma, Alabama, UCLA, Arkansas, Ohio State,
Tennessee, Georgia Tech, Wisconsin, and most notably (in our view) Northwestern.
130. This would make the average age of an NFL stadium just over twenty-one years.
Making a similar adjustment for the remade Jacksonville stadium, the average NFL stadium is
slightly less than twenty years old.
131. Stadium History, UNIV. OF MICH., http://www.umich.edu/stadium/history (last visited
Sept. 28, 2012); Big House Again! Michigan Stadium Capacity Announced at 109,901,
MGoBLUE.COM (Jul. 14, 2010), http://www.mgoblue.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-
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Though a university's campus anchors the football team's stadium,
end-of-season bowl game locations are in the main decision variables
for the NCAA. Like professional leagues, the NCAA can act as a cartel
for its member institutions when entertaining bids to host bowls, pitting
city -against city. The NCAA's demands are stringent, including
substantial financial side payments from the host, and the organization
is sensitive to stadium attributes. As Appendix 2 shows, at thirty-nine
years old on average, bowl stadiums are nearly twenty-six years
younger than the home fields of the major conferences.132
The third oldest NFL stadium at fifty-four is Green Bay's, unique
among major professional North American teams in any sport in being a
non-profit corporation owned by the community, a community thus
immune to team exit threats. In that regard at least, community
ownership is a substitute for promotion and relegation. It is notable as
well that Green Bay, roughly the size of the Premier League's
Blackburn, is by far the smallest American city with a major league
team. But Green Bay is substantially larger than Burnley, which was
relegated from the Premier League in 2010. It appears that in addition to
providing a defense against a team's extortionate exit threats, promotion
and relegation shields against loss of a team merely because the host
city is small. Just as many major collegiate football teams such as
Clemson, Penn State, or Texas A&M are found in small, out-of-the-way
towns, so teams from places like Carlisle, Ipswich, and Oxford
sometimes play in the top tier of English soccer.
Whether examining professional English soccer versus major league
North American stadium age or else internal U.S. data comparing
collegiate and professional leagues, the data strongly confirm the
hypothesis that control over league size combined with control over
entry and exit creates the credible threat that enables stadium rent-
seeking. As the English-American comparison shows, league structure
can solve that competition problem: promotion and relegation would be
a solution to stadium rent-seeking. We now examine the feasibility of
this and other solutions under American antitrust law.
rel/07141 Oaad.html.
132. The Rose, Orange, Sugar, and Fiesta Bowls alternate as the site of the BCS national
championship game. The average age of those four stadiums is virtually identical to the overall
average. Three stadiums host two bowl games apiece; the overall average falls by one year if
their ages enter the calculation only once.
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III. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
A. Antitrust and the Industrial Organization of Sporting Leagues
Federal antitrust law prohibits contracts combinations, and
conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade.' Though leagues are
classic cartels in many senses, they have suffered few adverse antitrust
decisions of any sort, and no one has even attempted seriously to apply
antitrust law to restrict stadium rent-seeking. 3 4 That antitrust law fails
to curb stadium rent-seeking is not because antitrust is ina plicable to
sport,135 nor because sporting leagues lack market power. Antitrust
133. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty.
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982) (citing United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S.
505 (1898) (indicating that as early as 1898, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress could
not have intended a literal interpretation of the word "every")); Nat'1 Soc'y of Prof'1 Engineers
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978) ("[R]estraint is the very essence of every contract
[and if] read literally, § 1 [of the Sherman Act] would outlaw the entire body of private contract
law."); Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil Co.
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
134. See infra Subsection III.B.3 (explaining how the decision in Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum may exacerbate the stadium rent seeking problem).
135. Baseball has long enjoyed an unusual exemption from antitrust laws. In Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professionall Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922), the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that baseball was not the subject of
interstate commerce because "[t]he business is giving exhibitions of base ball" and thus the
Sherman Act does not apply. Id. at 208-09. Even if the statement was accurate in 1922 (a
dubious proposition even then), it is erroneous today given the significant interstate revenues
attributable to licensing fees and television and the frequency with which fans now travel with
their team. The editors of Baseball and the American Legal Mind regard Federal Baseball as
"one of [Justice Holmes'] most heavily criticized decisions and a source of embarrassment,"
which is a generous understatement. SPENCER WEBER WALLER ET AL., BASEBALL AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 76 (1995). Nonetheless, in Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that baseball
remains exempt from antitrust liability. In Flood, the Court recognized that baseball-like other
sports-is engaged in interstate commerce, but it refused to withdraw baseball's exemption,
relying upon stare decisis. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-85. Thus, for reasons that are entirely
anomalous, professional baseball has enjoyed virtually a complete exemption from antitrust
challenges. See EARL W. KINTNER, 1 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 6.2 (1980).
136. League representatives argue that they are merely small players in the general
entertainment market. See, e.g., U.S. Football League v. NFL, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1057
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (declining to accept the NFL's argument that there is no product market for
professional football). Each league dominates its respective market segment, however, and has a
price seeker's ability to increase prices by restricting output. Cf United States v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956 ) ("Monopoly power is the power to control prices or
exclude competition."). And numerous courts have found that sports leagues are sufficiently
different from other forms of entertainment and that the dominant league exercises market
power. U.S. Football League, 644 F. Supp. at 1056; Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 550 F. Supp
558, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("There is no doubt that the NFL currently has a monopoly in the
United States in major league football."); see also Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 531 (7th Cir.
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law's failure is grounded in the necessity of some forms of cooperation
in a sports league, obscuring the boundary between legitimate and
illegitimate collusion among franchises,137 and the difficulty of fitting
rent-seeking into a recognizable antitrust cause of action.138
Sporting competitions are adversarial on the playing field but, of
necessity, cooperative in the boardroom because a well-functioning
league requires agreement on fundamentals: the rules of the game,
uniforms, equipment, dates and locations of contests, and the size and
structure of the competition. In any given year, a fixed game schedule
necessitates a closed league. Accordingly, most North Americans
assume that there is no way to have a single top tier league without
having a cartel. To the contrary, sports leagues throughout most of the
world demonstrate that a closed league during a competitive season is
consistent with an open league across a longer period. No justification
exists for anything beyond a transitory, episodic cartel structure.
How, then, should courts assess concerted action by individual
franchises given that it would be impossible to organize a league
without extensive coordination?l 39 The interdependence of franchises
has led some courts to view leagues as "single entities" incapable of
entering into a contract combination, or conspiracy in violation of § 1
of the Sherman Act.1wo However, the Supreme Court rejected that
defense in the recent American Needle decision. 14 1 The Court noted that
"[t]he fact that NFL teams share an interest in making the entire league
successful and profitable, and that they must cooperate in the production
and scheduling of games, provides a perfectly sensible justification for
1986); L.A. Mem'1 Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984); Phila.
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
137. See infra Section III.A.
138. See infra Section III.B.
139. See Paul H. Brietzke, Robert H. Bork's The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with
Itself 13 VAL. U. L. REV. 403 (1979) (book review) ("All league sports. . . rest entirely upon the
right to boycott."); Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust,
The Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV 943, 946-47
(1988) ("Because organizationally a sports league is not entirely analogous to any other type of
enterprise, legal doctrines created and developed in more traditional business contexts do not
easily or always correctly apply to league rules and conduct."); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v.
NFL., 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (analyzing concerted action by individual franchise within the
NFL); JAMES QuIRK & RODNEY FORT, HARD BALL: THE ABUSE OF POWER IN PRO TEAM SPORTS
117-37 (1999).
140. See generally Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the
Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991) (summarizing
arguments and concluding that the nature of sports leagues does not justify a fundamental
departure from the antitrust rules applicable to other joint ventures).
141. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2213.
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making a host of collective decisions." 42 Nevertheless, the Court saw
these justifications for concerted activity as mitigating factors in
particular instances; such justifications did not forge separate economic
actors into a single entity to which § 1 of the Sherman Act could never
be applied. 143
Courts generally are suspicious of competitors' agreements to raise
prices or exclude competition, frequently deeming them per se illegal
regardless of any procompetitive impact.'" But courts are not blind to
the potential benefits of coordinated activity in appropriate cases,1 4 5 so
league activities should be scrutinized under a "Rule of Reason"
standard. 4 6 In NCAA v. Board of Regents,147 the Supreme Court
explained that the rule of reason is the more appropriate approach to "an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the
product is to be available at all." 48
The essence of the rule of reason is that the legality of a business
practice depends on whether the practice promotes or suppresses
competition.14 9 The rule of reason enables courts to balance pro-
competitive effects, such as economies of scale, technological
development, and product integration, against aspects of collaboration
that appear to foreclose competition. Whereas courts and antitrust
enforcement agencies once treated partnerships and joint ventures with
suspicion, there is now a clear recognition that both vertical and
142. Id. at 2216.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
(stating that vertical agreements increase competitive effectiveness and, therefore, are judged
under the rule of reason, while "[c]ertain agreements, such as horizontal price fixing and market
allocation, are thought so inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal per se"); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977) (indicating that vertical restrictions
reduce intrabrand competition but promote interbrand competition thereby allowing
manufacturers to compete more effectively against each other); United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) (allocating territories to minimize competition is a horizontal
restraint which constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
145. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986); NCAA v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984).
146. See, e.g.,.L.A. Mem'1 Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (9th Cir.
1984); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543
F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976); see generally Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: Relevant
Product Market Definition in Sports Franchise Relocation Cases, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245,
249 n.16 (2000) ("The rule of reason has emerged as the proper test for evaluating sports
leagues under § 1.").
147. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
148. Id. at 101.
149. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978); Bd. of
Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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horizontal alliances can enhance consumer welfare.' 5 0 The importance
of giving due weight to these effects is illustrated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, Inc.151 Broadcast Music (BMI) is a performing-rights society
for musical works; the society offers blanket licenses for a large catalog
of material, an activity that necessarily involves fixing prices. Although
price fixing is usually treated as a per se violation, the Supreme Court
applied a rule of reason analysis and held that BMI's integration of
functions created significant efficiencies and allowed the copyright
owners to offer, in effect, a different product.152
The obvious potential benefits of integration entailed in some
partnerships and joint ventures justifies a full comparison with the costs
of such an arrangement, and differentiates sporting leagues from "naked
cartels." However, the mere assertion of such benefits does not shield a
combination from antitrust scrutiny. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the
Supreme Court summarized the balance of the law as follows: "While
joint ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws, as Broadcast
Music indicates, a joint selling arrangement may make possible a new
product by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies."" The NCAA
characterized its television plan as a cooperative joint venture in a
similar vein to BMI. The NCAA argued its price-fixing plan assisted
individual colleges in marketing broadcast rights and was thus pro-
competitive. The Supreme Court disagreed: "Unlike Broadcast Music's
blanket license covering broadcast rights to a large number of individual
compositions, here the same rights are still sold on an individual basis,
only in a noncompetitive market."' 54 As NCAA v. Board of Regents
indicates, a restraint that is reasonably necessary to achieve the welfare-
enhancing ends of a collaborative effort will not constitute an antitrust
violation, but the mere invocation of partnership or joint venture is
insufficient to establish that claim.' 5 5
In other words, NCAA v. Board ofRegents suggests that it is open to
a defendant to argue that the closed and anticompetitive structure of
American sporting is justified by offsetting pro-competitive effects, but
that such a conclusion is by no means guaranteed. As Parts I and II
150. See FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 23-25 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES].
151. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
152. Id. at 22-24.
153. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
154. Id. at 113-14.
155. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 150, at 8-9; see also United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 290-91 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1898).
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established, a smoothly functioning sports league does not require
endowing incumbents with permanent entry control. The decision to
operate as a closed league constitutes an agreement to foreclose
competition by new entrants,156 and that in turn gives franchises
extraordinary leverage to negotiate for ever-greater subsidies. The
current closed system has enabled teams to leverage credible threats to
relocate into extraordinary stadium subsidies.157 Our empirical evidence
confirms that the lack of a promotion and relegation system, while not
the only cause, is a sufficient cause of this dire public choice problem.
But no matter how direct the line from league structure to stadium rent-
seeking might be, the question still remains whether there is cognizable
antitrust claim under existing law.
B. A Competition Problem Without an Antitrust Solution
Although it is clear that the closed and anticompetitive structure of
American sporting leagues enables extraordinary rent-seeking in the
form of stadium subsidies, it is far from clear that current antitrust law
provides any remedy. The reason for this disconnect is that antitrust law
is designed to cure problems in the marketplace but it does not address
political problems, even those with anticompetitive implications. The
stadium rent-seeking problem sits oddly at the intersection of political
and market structures. This Section reviews the three most promising
antitrust law solutions to stadium rent-seeking and address their
limitations.
1. Collective Boycott
The closed entry system in American sporting leagues creates
artificial scarcity of the most extreme kind: it is, for example, literally
impossible for a city to procure an NFL team to play in its stadium
without the permission of the majority of existing NFL teams.'"' This
absolute scarcity puts the incumbent franchises in a position to make
credible threats to leave a city in order to extract favorable terms,
usually in the form of stadium construction or renovation subsidies.
When such threats are made by a single economic entity, they do not
constitute an antitrust violation. Although the European Union
recognizes abuse of a dominant market position as violation of
competition law, courts and agencies in the United States generally see
a monopolist charging unreasonably high prices as an invitation to
156. Ross & Szymanski, supra note 11, at 642.
157. Id.; see also Noll, supra note 11; Cain & Haddock supra note 11.
158. The same holds true for MLB. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL CONST., art. V, § 2(b).
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competition and nothing that, by itself, justifies antitrust intervention.159
However, when several economic actors agree between themselves to
shut out rivals or to refuse to deal with customers or suppliers, except
on agreed terms, such concerted action generally constitutes an
unlawful horizontal restraint, specifically a collective boycott.
The collective boycott argument is as follows: given the artificial
scarcity of teams and the difficulty of new entry, threats to relocate are
more than the action of an individual economic entity; rather, every
threat to relocate is also an implicit threat of a concerted boycott. A
group boycott exists when individual economic actors agree to refrain
from dealing with another entity in order to gain some competitive
advantage, in this case the advantage of favorable subsidies to build or
renovate new stadiums.
Although the classic group boycott involves excluding competitors
from a market, a boycott can also be aimed at customers, suppliers or
both. The case of FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association& is
a close parallel to the situation faced by American cities in their
dealings with sports franchises.161 In that case, a group of lawyers
agreed not to represent indigent criminal defendants in the District of
Columbia Superior Court until the District raised the lawyers' pay.16 2
The FTC portrayed the lawyers' conduct as "a conspiracy to fix prices
and to conduct a boycott" in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.163 The FTC found that a "coercive, concerted refusal
to deal had the purpose and effect of raising prices and was illegal per
se."1 64 The Supreme Court agreed that the concerted action was a plain
violation of the antitrust laws and should be condemned on a per se
analysis. 6 5
159. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d
1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A natural monopolist that acquired and maintained its monopoly
without excluding competitors by improper means is not guilty of 'monopolizing' in violation of
the Sherman Act .. . and can therefore charge any price that it wants.") (internal citation
omitted).
160. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
161. See id. at 414.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 418 (internal quotation omitted).
164. Id. at 419 (internal quotation omitted).
165. Id. at 436. Although the classic group boycott is considered to be a per se violation of
the antitrust laws, see NYNEX Corp. v. Discon Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1998), the "per se
approach is generally limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or
customers in order to discourage them from doing business with a competitor," FTC v. Ind.
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986). See also N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac.
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,293-98 (1985) (addressing the question of when per se
antitrust analysis is appropriately applied to joint activity susceptible of being characterized as a
concerted refusal to deal).
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There is some evidence to bolster the collective boycott theory, at
least with respect to the NFL. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded almost as much in the Raiders decision when it noted that
"the League has in the past allowed teams to threaten a transfer to
another location in order to give the . team leverage in lease
negotiations."l 66 The court found that prior to its dispute with the
Raiders, the NFL had remained expressly noncommittal when owners
were renegotiating leases with their respective stadiums. 6 7 In addition,
a statement attributed to NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue also could
be taken as evidence of an express collective boycott threat. When the
Houston Oilers threatened to move to Jacksonville, Florida, in 1987,
Harris County, Texas, responded with $67.5 million in improvements to
be funded by property tax increases, doubling the county's hotel tax,1
and underwriting bonds to be paid over the next thirty years.1 Within
six years, the Oilers began lobbying for a new stadium with club
seating. Commissioner Tagliabue reportedly warned: "If the Oilers'
situation doesn't work down there, I don't see any circumstances in
which we're going to guarantee [Houston a team, especially when one
team's already found it unsatisfactory."' 6 Translation: If Houston does
not pay the price demanded by the Oilers, no other NFL team will deal
with the city. At the end of the 1996 season, the Oilers moved to
Nashville, where city officials had promised to contribute $144 million
toward a new stadium.'7 0
More recently, the NFL's insistence that L.A. will not be allowed an
NFL team until it foots the bill for a new stadium could be taken to
indicate that a concerted boycott of that city is ongoing. It is noteworthy
that Houston repented of its sin, built a nice new stadium, genuflected
before the league, and contritely accepted an expansion franchise in
2002. In contrast, thanks to promotion and relegation, Wimbledon was
without a team for nary a day when its incumbent leapt across London
to a suburb on the far side; Houston was without a team for five years
after its incumbent leapt across Louisiana and Mississippi to Tennessee.
If proved, such boycotts, and the closed league structure that enables
them, cannot be justified under a rule of reason standard. There is no
166. L.A. Mem'1 Coliseum Comm'n. v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984).
167. Id.
168. Sports Law--Come Back, Shane: The Movement of Professional Sports Teams,
http://law.jrank.org/pages/10434/Sports-Law-COME-BACK-SHANE-MOVEMENT-
PROFESSIONAL-SPORTS-TEAMS.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
169. Mitten & Burton, supra note 33, at 104 n.255 (citing John McClain, Tagliabue: City
Won't Get Guarantee, HOus. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1996, at Cl).
170. Garrett Johnson, The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities, 10 U.
DENv. SPoRTs & ENT. L.J. 1, 31 (2011). The Oilers are now the Tennessee Titans. See id at 29.
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pro-competitive justification for collective negotiation with cities qua
stadium suppliers. However, the viability of the collective boycott cause
of action is far from certain. Even assuming that an allegation of a
concerted boycott was backed up by sufficient evidence to survive the
post-Twombly pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2),'7 1 it faces the argument that there is no antitrust
injury upon which to base a claim. The core of this objection is that the
stadium rent-seeking that results from the closed market structure of
sporting leagues is a political problem, not a market injury.
Although antitrust law has a broad remit to prevent and remedy
harms to consumers, it has no role in preventing harm to voters. The
antitrust laws do not-and because of the First Amendment probably
could not-take aim at failures of the political process. This objection
can be framed narrowly along the lines of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine which shields certain activity from the scrutiny of antitrust law,
or more broadly as a fundamental objection that rent-seeking, in spite of
its obvious harms to the body politic, does not occasion any market
harms within the remit of antitrust law.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides that there is no violation
when competitors jointly petition legislative bodies for laws that are
anticompetitive.172 However, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is limited
by its underlying rationale; although it protects businesses as they lobby
for anticompetitive ends-such as licensing laws and state-sanctioned
monopolies-the doctrine does not shield anticompetitive means of
influencing governmental action where the government is acting as a
market participant. Accordingly, in Trial Lawyers, P 3 a concerted
boycott aimed at forcing the government of the District of Columbia to
pay more for legal services was not protected under Noerr-
Pennington.174 The doctrine was also found to be inapplicable in Hecht
v. Pro-Football, Inc.1 75 In that case, would-be competitors to the
171. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court held that
a well-pleaded claim must contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The Court held that threadbare recitals of a cause of action's
elements, supported by mere conclusory statements, would be insufficient to meet this standard,
but cautioned that determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific,
requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense. See id. at 556-57.
172. E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961);
see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) ("Joint efforts to
influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate
competition.").
173. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
174. Id. at 428 ("The exceptions derived from Noerr and Claiborne Hardware have no
application to respondents' boycott.").
175. 444 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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Washington Redskins sought the use of the Robert F. Kennedy Stadium,
the only suitable venue for professional football in the District of
Columbia.'7 6 The entrants sought to use the stadium at times that would
not conflict with the Redskins, but the District of Columbia Armory
Board refused because it had entered into a thirty-year lease prohibiting
use of the stadium by any professional football team other than the
Washington Redskins. 1 77 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs antitrust
claims in summary judgment on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 178 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, rejecting "the facile
conclusion that action by any public official automatically confers
exemption."l79 The court held that absent clear statutory guidance to the
contrary, federal antitrust laws were applicable to the Amory Board as
the custodian of the stadium.' 80
Arguably, even if a plaintiff could demonstrate that the favorable
terms upon which cities deal with sports franchises were the result of a
concerted boycott, the harm which results is an injury to taxpayers-an
injury which does not constitute an antitrust injury because citizens qua
taxpayers are not consumers. The coordinated rent extraction that is
facilitated by anticompetitive league structure is not completely
analogous to the conduct of the trial lawyers in FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Association.181 In that case, the District of Columbia was
the customer, it paid the lawyers' fees, and the lawyers were attempting
coordinated price-fixing in order to extract higher fees. 182 In the context
of stadium rent-seeking, any given government entity may not be the
direct supplier of stadium infrastructure. The complex and opaque
nature of stadium financing makes this more likely than one might
presume. Many cities pay for stadiums that they do not technically own.
For example, Soldier Field in Chicago is owned by the Chicago Park
District; the Park District is an independent statutory authority and is
not directly controlled by the City of Chicago.' 83 In 2000, the Illinois
legislature enacted legislation authorizing a $432 million bond issue for
the effective demolition and rebuilding of Soldier Field; the bond issue
was paid for, in part, by a 2% tax on Chicago hotel rooms.1 84 The court
in the Raiders antitrust litigation drew a distinction between the direct
176. Id. at 933.
177. Id. at 932.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 934 (quoting George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc. 424
F.2d 25, 80 (1st Cir. 1970)).
180. Id. at 947.
181. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
182. Id. at 414.
183. See Chicago Park District Act, 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1505/0.01 (1981).
184. Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 164 (111. 2003).
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loss suffered by the L.A. Coliseum and the indirect effects on local
businesses, finding that the former conferred antitrust standing but the
latter did not.'8 5 In cities where the legal entity controlling the stadium
and the taxpayers who pay for it are linked only indirectly, an antitrust
injury may be hard to establish.186
Looking beyond technicalities, a court might reasonably conclude
that even if the paying political entity happens to be the owner of the
sports facility (or the land for a new facility), that relationship is merely
serendipitous. When teams leverage credible threats of relocation in
order to extract government subsidies, they do not care which taxpayers
ultimately foot the bill. Thus, even if the leveraged municipality owns
the relevant stadium, a court may well find that the municipality is
injured (if at all) as a political entity, not as a supplier of sports
facilities. In short, courts may well resist attempts to shoehorn a public
choice injury into the antitrust market regulation framework.
The significant question here is whether an injury that can be fairly
characterized as both a market injury and a political injury should be
automatically removed from the ambit of antitrust law. One could take
the view that injuries to competition that arise through market
manipulation should be addressed through the antitrust system
regardless of their intersection with politics. However, courts anxious to
avoid controversy are more likely to insist that rent-seeking is an
essentially political problem that should be resolved through political
mechanisms.
2. League Expansion: Antitrust Claims by Excluded Teams
If deserted cities are unable (or unwilling) to pursue a collective
boycott claim against an anticompetitive league, there is little prospect
that a would-be new entrant would succeed either. Under a system of
promotion and relegation, a city can replace a top tier team with a lower
division team or even a new team. With sufficient financial backing to
obtain quality players and coaching staff, the new team will ascend to
top tier in a matter of a few years." Under the American system, a city
can only replace a lost team if the league decides to allow it. One
solution to the problem of restricted entry would simply be to force the
leagues to expand and admit new teams. 88 Whatever the merits of this
185. See L.A. Mem'1 Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986).
186. Id.
187. With a high enough win rate, it would take only one season to take a team from the
Championship Division to the Premier League; two from League One; and so on.
188. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of Sports
Leagues, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 1677, 1679 (1996) (arguing that leagues could be required to undergo
"reasonable expansion" under either the essential facilities doctrine or the ancillary restraints
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proposal might be as a matter of social policy, it seems far-fetched as an
antitrust case. For a court to order league expansion as a remedy, there
would have to be an underlying violation. If the claimed violation is
simply that the decision by the league not to admit a given team was
unjustified, leagues have very little cause for concern.
Two cases, Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football Leaguel89 and
Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League,90 are
illustrative. The Memphis Southmen were a member of the ill-fated
World Football League in 1974 and 1975.191 When the World Football
League disbanded halfway through the 1975 season, the Southmen
rebranded as the Memphis Grizzlies and sought admission to the
NFL.192 At the time, the NFL had no franchise at Memphis, and a home
team designation for that location would not infringe upon the home
territory of any NFL member.193 When the Grizzlies's application was
rejected by the NFL, the team's owners sued, alleging that the rejection
was made pursuant to a conspiracy and that it amounted to an
unreasonable restraint of trade, or a group boycott. 94
Seattle Totems Hockey Club is more convoluted, as it involves the
interactions of three separate hockey leagues: the dominant National
Hockey League (NHL) and two would-be competitors, the Western
Hockey League (WHL)-a minor league based in Canada-and the
World Hockey Association (WHA), based in New York.195 The NHL
doubled in size for the 1967-1968 season 96 and then added teams in
Vancouver and Buffalo in 1970. This expansion was driven by the
league's desire to expand its television audience, but also to suppress
the WHL's threat to turn itself into a major league. In 1972, the NHL
added teams in New York and Atlanta to stave off the threat of
competition from the newly formed WHA. In June 1974, the NHL
voted to award a conditional Seattle franchise to the owners of the
Seattle Totems, a team that was then part of the minor league WHL.197
The Totems did not seek or receive a WHA franchise.198 The Totems
had been slated to play in the NHL in the 1976-1977 season; however,
doctrine).
189. 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
190. 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1986).
191. Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 776.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 776-77. The Grizzlies' complaint was filed on December 3, 1979.
195. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, 783 F.2d at 1349.
196. Adding teams in Los Angeles, Minnesota, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Oakland, and St.
Louis.
197. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, 783 F.2d at 1349.
198. Id.
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the conditional franchise for Seattle expired because the owners of the
team did not fulfill the NHL's conditions.199 The Totems claimed that
their failure to receive an NHL franchise amounted to a violation of § 2
of the Sherman Act.200 They alleged "a grand scheme on the part of the
NHL to destroy the WHA by promising franchises to WHL teams so
that those teams would not join the WHA."20 1
Mid-South Grizzlies and Seattle Totems Hockey Club illustrate the
quixotic nature of antitrust suits aimed at compelling a particular league
to admit a particular team. Such lawsuits are bound to fail because of
the complexity of determining optimal league size and composition.202
Sport is worth watching precisely because outcomes are the result of
skill differentials, but nonetheless the outcome remains uncertain
beforehand. Uncertainty produces excitement. More precisely, the
excitement level of games is a function of two components of league
size: parity and variety.203 Parity is important because games are not
exciting if teams are mismatched and it is obvious who will win.
However, excessive parity can lead to a perception of mediocrity and a
204longing for the good old days of superstar players and dynastic teams.
Likewise, it is generally more interesting to watch Team A play Team C
than it would be to see them play Team B a second time. Moreover, if A
plays B too often, latent differences in parity will become more obvious.
In theory, there will be an optimal league size for any given sport, and,
if a league should expand, there will be an expansion team that is
preferable to all others. However, in practice, as the plaintiffs in Mid-
South Grizzlies and Seattle Totems Hockey Club discovered, it is very
difficult for any individual would-be entrant to establish that their
application was rejected for anticompetitive reasons and not in the
interests of maintaining optimal league size, parity, or some other
structural considerations. 205 The incumbent franchises will argue, quite
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1350. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits monopolizing or
combining and conspiring to monopolize any part of trade or commerce. Sherman Antitrust Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
201. Id. at 1350.
202. See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1983); Seattle
Totems Hockey Club, 783 F.2d at 1350.
203. Cain & Haddock, supra note 11, at 1130-31. Other structural factors influence parity
as well, most obviously revenue sharing, salary caps, and inter-team wealth transfers.
204. See Daniel Mizak et al., Assessing Alternative Competitive Balance Measures for
Sports Leagues: A Theoretical Examination of Standard Deviations, Gini Coefficients, the Index
of Dissimilarity, 12 EcoN. BULL. 1, 1 (2005), available at http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/eb/
2005/volumel2/EB-04L80002A.pdf.
205. See Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786; Seattle Totems Hockey Club, 783 F.2d at
1351.
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credibly, that they understand the nature of their sport and the optimal
league size better than a court could hope to.20 6
3. Reverse Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL207
A 1984 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision considerably
weakened the power of the NFL (and possibly other leagues) to prohibit
franchise relocations. In 1978, the Rams decided to vacate the Los
Angeles Coliseum for a better deal in suburban Anaheim. 208 The
Coliseum attempted to lure the Oakland Raiders as replacement
tenants.209 However, because of the proximity of Anaheim to Los
Angeles, the city was still designated as part of the Rams' territory.21 o
Without the permission of the Rams, the addition of a new league
member within their territory required three-quarters approval of all
twenty-eight teams under the NFL rules.2 11 The other teams voted
212twenty-two to zero to oppose the move.22 Following the vote, the
Raiders joined the Coliseum in an antitrust complaint against the other
members of the NFL.213
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League (Raiders),2 14 the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury verdict
that the NFL's relocation restriction violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.
206. This does not mean that incumbents actually set the league size according to socially
optimal considerations, merely that the complexity of these considerations provides cover for
whatever their true motives may be.
207. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
208. Id. at 1384.
209. Id. at 1385.
210. Id.
211. At the time, Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL Constitution demanded "unanimous
approval of all 28 teams of the League" before a team could relocate into a rival's territory. Id.
at 1384.
212. Id. at 1385. There were five abstentions and the Raiders did not get to vote. SEAN
LAHMAN, THE PRo FOOTBALL HISTORICAL ABSTRACT: A HARDCORE FAN's GUIDE TO ALL-TIME
PLAYER RANKINGS 44 (2008).
213. The City of Oakland also attempted unsuccessfully to use its power of eminent
domain to retain the Raiders. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 845 (Cal.
1982).
214. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Raiders].
215. It is unclear whether a decision by the MLB to block franchise relocation would fall
within the scope of baseball's judge-made antitrust exemption. In the only case directly on
point, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to dismiss a challenge to baseball's franchise
relocation restrictions but held that the scope of the exemption was limited to baseball's reserve
system. Piazza v. MLB, 831 F.Supp. 420, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (alleging that the MLB frustrated
their efforts to purchase the San Francisco Giants and relocate the team to the Tampa SMSA);
see also Butterworth v. Nat'l League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994). But
see McCoy v. MLB, 911 F.Supp. 454, 456-58 (W.D. Wash. 1995); New Orleans Pelicans
Baseball, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Prof I Baseball Leagues, Inc., 1994 WL 631144, at *8-9 (E.D.
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The appellate court agreed that the restraint caused significant harm to
competition and that less restrictive means could have achieved any
benefits.216 Subsequently, the NFL has been reluctant to block
relocation, even when detriment to the league is apparent.217 Franchise
relocation restrictions are not invalid per se under the decision, but are
subject to a "rule of reason" balancing test.2 18 However, the decision
had a substantial impact, as illustrated in 1995 when the NFL owners
chose to allow the Rams to move (again) to St. Louis after the Attorney
General of Missouri threatened to seek billions of dollars in punitive
damages if permission was denied.219 The owners had initially voted
against the move, but relented to avoid the risk of treble antitrust
damages.220 Consequently, many commentators have suggested that the
solution is less antitrust regulation. Specifically, they suggest giving
leagues antitrust immunity with respect to collective decisions regarding
relocation.22'
It is unlikely that merely giving the leagues an antitrust free pass in
this respect would address the problem. Rodney Fort provides the
sobering assessment that "leagues carefully husband viable alternative
threat locations" to enable teams endowed with market power to offer
all-or-nothing propositions to host cities.222 The individual franchises
La. 1994). See generally Jeffrey Gordon, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption And Franchise
Relocation: Can A Team Move? 26 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1201 (1999) (arguing that the baseball
exemption extends to the business of baseball, and thus includes franchise relocation rules). In
1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act, revoking baseball's antitrust exemption with respect
to labor relations. 15 U.S.C.A. § 26b. The Act does not affect the scope of baseball's antitrust
exemption with respect to "franchise expansion, location or relocation," nor does it indicate that
those things are within the scope of the exemption. Id. § 26b(b)(3). The passage of the Curt
Flood Act either eviscerates the baseball exemption or, more likely, belies the Piazza court's
claim that the exemption extends only to the reserve clause. See J. Philip Calabrese, Antitrust
and Baseball, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 531, 538 (1999).
216. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1395 ("Exclusive territories insulate each team from competition
within the NFL market, in essence allowing them to set monopoly prices to the detriment of the
consuming public. The rule also effectively foreclosed free competition among stadia such as
the Los Angeles Coliseum that wish to secure NFL tenants.. . . If the transfer is upheld, direct
competition between the Rams and Raiders would presumably ensue to the benefit of all who
consume the NFL product in the Los Angeles area.").
217. See Nottingham, supra note 108, at 1076.
218. See NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1987).
219. Nottingham, supra note 108, at 1075.
220. Id. at 1076. On the impact of the decision, see Travis T. Tygart, Antitrust's Impact on
the National Football League and Team Relocation, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 29, 31-34 (2000); see
also John Wunderli, Squeeze Play: The Game of Owners, Cities, Leagues and Congress, 5
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 83 (1994).
221. See, e.g., Mitten & Burton, supra note 33, at 138-39.
222. Rodney D. Fort, Stadium Votes, Market Power and Politics, 30 U. TOL. L. REv. 419,
419 (1999).
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will oppose relocation only if that will diminish their own revenues.
Though that will be clear with some opportunistic moves, it will not be
in others. Furthermore, although some franchise relocations may be
narrowly detrimental, they are nonetheless useful examples of the
wages of host resistance. Other teams have some incentive to stand
aside and allow a move because it strengthens their own future
threats.223 Finally, a relocation fee paid to the league can overcome
resistance by other league members. 4 As such, it is unsafe to assume
that giving greater antitrust immunity to leagues will result in less rather
than more harm to consumers and taxpayers.
4. The Question of Remedies
For the reasons we have already discussed, there is every reason to
believe that a system of promotion and relegation would produce
superior sporting competitions and substantially reduce, if not eliminate,
the stadium rent-seeking problem to which this article is addressed.
However, as reviewed in this Part, the problems caused by the
anticompetitive structure of American sporting leagues do not
necessarily lend themselves to solutions based in antitrust law. Even if
they did, one must address the question of whether the court ordered
imposition of a system of promotion and relegation is a viable remedy.
As a remedy, promotion and relegation is similar to, but distinct
from, the more drastic step of breaking up sporting leagues. A number
of commentators have advocated breaking professional sports leagues
into multiple independent entities. 225 Professor Stephen Ross argues that
judicially ordered divestiture would be an appropriate remedy for
correcting unlawful monopolization by a professional sports league.2 26
However, a simple breakup ignores the natural desire of sports fans to
compare the best against the best. As such, the proposal runs counter to
the history of professional sports, which has been one of increasing
223. Mitten & Burton, supra note 33, at 104 ("There is no reason to expect that franchise
owners routinely will interfere with their joint-venturers' efforts to make more money at the
taxpayers' expense.") (quoting Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV.
643, 654 (1989)).
224. See Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 146, at 246 n.6 ("Some commentators have
suggested that the real reason the [NFL) approved the Rams' move to St. Louis was because the
Rams agreed to pay the NFL a $71 million 'relocation fee."') (citing Sanjay Jos6 Mullick,
Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency and the New Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 1, 11 & n.55 (1996) (noting that the owners originally voted twenty-one to three
(with five abstentions) against the Rams move, but then voted twenty-three to six in favor, after
being offered the relocation fee)).
225. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE
SPORTS BETTER FOR FANS 333 (2000); Ross, supra note 223, at 715-33.
226. Ross, supra note 223, at 646.
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consolidation.227 History shows that the sports market is unlikely long to
sustain multiple top tier leagues within a given sport.228 It is also hard to
see how depriving the sporting public of the pinnacle of competition
would be consistent with promoting consumer welfare.
In contrast to simply breaking up monopolistic sporting leagues,
imposing a system of promotion and relegation would address the
credible threat problem we have identified but leave all other aspects of
decision making to the teams themselves. Courts favoring structural
remedies seek to address the fundamental causes of illegal conduct in a
way that does not require ongoing court supervision: they seek, in other
words, to "pry open to competition a market that has been closed by
defendants' illegal restraints." 229 However, although structural remedies
may appear to be preferable to behavioral ones-given the difficulty of
adapting injunctions to changing market conditions2 30 -the recent trend
in antitrust law has been away from structural remedies. At least since
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,231 structural remedies have fallen out
of favor with courts, commentators, and government agencies because
structural remedies may be just as likely to create inefficiencies that
harm consumers as was the antitrust violation complained of.232 In
particular, even if a court were convinced of the benefits of promotion
and relegation (which it should be) it may nevertheless be wary of the
transitional costs of moving from the current system.
To summarize, it is far from clear that antitrust law offers good
solutions to the problems caused by the closed and anticompetitive
structure of American sporting leagues. As set forth above, a court
could quite reasonably (although not inevitably) take the view that the
stadium rent-seeking resulting from the closed market structure of
sporting leagues is essentially a political problem and not a market
injury. Likewise, at the remedy stage, a court might be reluctant to take
on the task of determining the best way to transition from current league
cartels to a system of open competition through promotion and
relegation. The ambiguity as to whether this is a market problem or a
political problem combined with the uncertainty as to the appropriate
227. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 921, 935 (2001) (reviewing PAUL C.
WElLER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS BETrER FOR FANS
(2000)).
228. See Edelman, supra note 75, at 301.
229. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 577-78 (1972) (quoting Int'l Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947)) (internal quotation omitted).
230. Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 88
(2009); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE To MERGER
REMEDIES 7 n.12 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf.
231. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
232. Id. at 49.
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remedy given potential transition costs may well counsel abstention in
favor of a political solution. Obviously, however, neither of those
reasons should deter Congress from taking steps to address the distorted
market structure that enables franchises to hold American cities hostage
to extravagant demands for subsidies.
A system of promotion and relegation is just one solution Congress
should consider, but it would be less radical than simply breaking up
existing leagues.233 Imposing a system of promotion and relegation on
American sporting leagues would have significant benefits beyond
addressing the public choice problem of stadium rent-seeking.
CONCLUSION
The end of the season is a dreary affair for the teams at the bottom
of the NFL and NBL ladders. By contrast, the end of the season in a
promotion and relegation system sets hearts racing at both ends of the
table.
Roy Hodgson took over as the coach of struggling Fulham FC on
December 30, 2008, halfway through the 2008-2009 English Premier
League Season.234 The team improved under Hodgson, but still looked
bound to be relegated with three games to go. To avoid relegation,
Fulham had to win all three games and hope for favorable results in
other matches. In that third to last game, with twenty minutes
remaining, the team was down 0-2 away against this year's current
leaders, Manchester City.2 35 At this point, due to results in other
matches, Fulham were mathematically relegated-if results stayed the
same, it was out of the top competition. Hodgson substituted the much
maligned Diomansy Kamara at halftime; the two goals he went on to
score in the second half were instrumental in Fulham's astonishing 3-2
comeback. Fulham then won their next match against another struggling
team, Birmingham City, putting it in relegation danger. On the final day
of the season Fulham faced off against Portsmouth. But it would not be
enough to avoid relegation for Fulham to beat Portsmouth-their fate
also depended on what happened in other games being played
simultaneously on the final day of the season.
Joining Fulham at the bottom of the table were four teams facing
potential relegation that happened to be playing one another in the final
round: Derby versus Reading, and Birmingham versus Blackburn. At
233. Changes to the tax code and the laws relating to municipal bonds may also alleviate
the public choice problems we have identified in this Article; they are, however, beyond its
scope. For a discussion of tax related issues, see, for example, Mitten & Burton, supra note 33,
at 144-48.
234. The team was then ranked nineteenth out of twenty.
235. The team which is leading the EPL as this paragraph is being written.
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3:15 p.m., James Harper scored a goal against Derby, lifting Reading
out of the relegation zone. Birmingham fans listening on their radios
while watching their own game became feverish with anxiety; but
seventeen minutes later, David Murphy scored for Birmingham, placing
them 1-0 ahead of Blackburn. Even then, to avoid relegation,
Birmingham needed Derby to defeat Reading. At 4:09 p.m., Blackburn
drew level with Birmingham at 1-1, thanks to a goal from Morten
Gamst Pedersen. At this stage, Fulham and Birmingham were set for
relegation along with Derby. This standing was made all the more likely
when Dave Kitson scored a second goal for Reading at 4:19 p.m. Then
Cameron Jerome scored for Birmingham at 4:33 p.m., making the score
2-1, but the insufficiency of this result was confirmed when Kevin
Doyle put Reading 3-0 ahead moments later. Then, at 4:35 p.m., with
less than fifteen minutes of regular time remaining, Fulham's Danny
Murphy scored a fantastic header inside the penalty box and the score
remained 1-0 at full time. Fulham had survived the season, beating out
236Reading on goal difference, despite its sensational 4-0 victory.
Back home, in contrast, the end of the season is at best irrelevant for
most American teams who are out of contention; at worst, there are
actually perverse incentives at the bottom of the table-the worse that a
23team performs, the better its pick in the draft for next year.23 In 2011,
multiple teams had been counseled to perform as badly as possible, to
"suck for Luck"--that is, to aim to be the bottom team so as to have the
first pick of the draw and thus a chance to draft Andrew Luck,
Stanford's exceptional quarterback.238 The draft system is not simply a
form of salary capping-it is a necessary device given that there is no
promotion and relegation. Without relegation, there is no way to get rid
of poorly performing teams. Short of allowing some teams to simply get
worse and worse but nonetheless stay in league, it is necessary to have
this artificial system of equalization. But there exists an alternative
system for managing team quality that simultaneously avoids the costly
rents of multimillion or even billion-dollar taxpayer funded sporting
stadiums: promotion and relegation.
The economic and legal literature thoroughly documents the
consequence and extent of public spending by American cities for the
236. How the Battle to Avoid relegation Unfolded, THE GuARDtAN, May 11, 2008, at 9.
237. In the NFL, the worst team gets the best draft pick. Poor performance is rewarded in a
more indirect fashion in other leagues. In MLB the top three draft picks are randomly allocated
among the fourteen teams that did not make the playoffs the year before.
238. See Steve Politi, 'Suck for Luck' Could Be Best Hope for NFL's Worst, CNN.coM
(Oct. 21, 2011, 4:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/21/us/suck-for-luck-could-be-best-
hope-for-nfls-worst/index.htmi.
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private benefit of professional sporting franchises. 239 New stadiums
arise from the rubble of not-so-old ones, at public expense, often before
the public has paid off the debt incurred for the previous model. That is
a consequence of the extraordinary leverage that American leagues hold
over cities, a fact that many commentators have understood without
properly diagnosing the source.
The frequency of team movements and magnitude of public
handouts in America in comparison with England cannot arise solely
from passionate public interest in sports or the frailty of the political
process. Nor is the ability of teams to move the culprit. Avid sporting
interest, imperfect political systems, and team mobility characterize
both America and England. The characteristics manifest themselves in
extraordinary ways in America because of the exceptional
organizational structure of American leagues: closed entry severely
restricts team supply and enables incumbents to make credible threats to
relocate. That stimulates offers of better terms from rival cities that have
no team, and a host city wishing to avoid the team's exit must match or
exceed the rival offers. An English team could make the same threat,
but it would be hollow, as the birth of AFC Wimbledon has
demonstrated. The relative openness fostered by promotion and
relegation shields localities from extortion; local fans have at hand a
ready option to shift allegiance to a different local team, and by so
doing to push it up the ranks. American fans have no assured substitutes
if the local team leaves, and thus possess a much weaker weapon
against credible threats, not merely of departure but of long-term
deprivation, as the NFL has pointedly taught Los Angeles residents for
the past sixteen years.
This Article has applied a comparative insight to shed new light on
the much-lamented problem of stadium rent-seeking. The insight is
simple: English football shows that major sports leagues do not require
absolute control over league composition. The closed cartel system is a
poor option in comparison to an automatic, episodically open,
promotion and relegation system.
Professional American sporting leagues have been cartels for so
long that this artificial structure has taken on the appearance of
normality, a false premise that distorts antitrust analysis. A comparison
with English soccer demonstrates that cooperation on some aspects of
competition does not necessitate cooperation on all aspects. With that
evident, the illegitimacy of cartels threatening collective boycotts
against cities unless they play the subsidy game becomes transparent.
However, even though the closed structure of the American leagues is
239. See supra Part L.
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clearly, in the normal sense of the word, a competition problem, it may
not be amenable to an antitrust law solution.
Stadium rent-seeking occurs at the intersection of flawed political
and market structures. Courts may well take the view that although
franchise leverage is an artifact of a distorted market, the injury in the
form of public subsidies is political in nature and not within the scope of
antitrust law. Given the logistical issues to be resolved in transitioning
from the existing cartel to open competition through promotion and
relegation, it would be best if Congress rather than the courts tackled the
issue. Promotion and relegation is not the only conceivable remedy for
stadium rent-seeking, but it would elegantly restructure incentives of the
incumbents without interfering with internal franchise decisions that are
not merely benign but beneficial.
Imagine an American team earning its place at the top table through
sporting achievement while its fans and sponsors pay for the field on
which the team plays, sparing other taxpayers who could hardly care
less about the team's performance. That sounds almost like English
soccer. It would not be such a bad thing.
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Appendix 1
NFL & Bowl Championship Series College Football Team
Stadiums-2012 Season
Legend Updated 19 Sept.
12011
Stadium of National Football League Team
Stadium of NCAA Football Team from Automatically Qualifying BCS
Conference
Stadium ofNCAA Football Team From Non-Automatically Qualifying BCS Eligible
Conference
Team Year Opened Age Notes
New York 2010 1 NFL shared w. Jets
Giants
New York Jets 2010 1 NFL shared w. Giants
Dallas 2009 2 NFL shared w. Cotton Bowl
Cowboys
U of 2009 2 Big 10
Minnesota
Indianapolis 2008 3 NFL
Colts
Central 2007 4 C USA
Florida
Arizona 2006 5 NFL shared w. Fiesta Bowl
Cardinals
Stanford 2006 5 PAC 12
Philadelphia 2003 8 NFL shared w. Temple
Eagles
Temple 2003 8 MAC shared w. Eagles
U Conn 2003 8 Big
East
Detroit Lions 2002 9 NFL
Houston 2002 9 NFL shared w. Texas Bowl
Texans
New England 2002 9 NFL shared w. U Mass at Amherst
Patriots
U Mass at 2002 9 MAC shared w. Patriots
Amherst
Seattle 2002 9 NFL
Seahawks
Denver 2001 10 NFL
Broncos
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Pittsburgh 2001 10 NFL shared w. Pitt
Steelers
Pitt 2001 10 Big shared w. Steelers *Impending
East* move to ACC
Cincinnati 2000 11 NFL
Bengals
Southern 2000 11 C USA shared w. Armed Forces Bowl
Methodist
Cleveland 1999 12 NFL
Browns
Tennessee 1999 12 NFL shared w. Music City Bowl
Titans
Baltimore 1998 13 NFL
Ravens
Tampa Bay 1998 13 NFL shared w. South Florida &
Buccaneers Outback Bowl
South Florida 1998 13 Big Shared w. Buccaneers & Outback
East Bowl
Middle 1998 13 Sun
Tennessee Belt
Louisville 1998 13 Big
East
Utah 1998 13 PAC 12
Washington 1997 14 NFL
Redskins
Carolina 1996 15 NFL
Panthers
St. Louis 1995 16 NFL
Rams
Florida 1995 16 Sun
International Belt
Rutgers 1994 17 Big
East
Suny at 1993 18 MAC
Buffalo
UT San 1993 18 WAC shared w. Alamo Bowl
Antonio
Atlanta 1992 19 NFL
Falcons
Marshall 1991 20 C USA
Miami 1987 24 NFL shared w. U of Miami (Florida)
Dolphins & Orange Bowl
U of Miami 1987 24 ACC shared w. Dolphins & Orange
66 FLORIDA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 65
HeinOnline  -- 65 Fla. L. Rev. 66 2013
LEAGUE STRUCTURE & STADIUMRENT-SEEKING
(Florida) Bowl
Miami 1983 28 MAC
University
(Ohio)
Minnesota 1982 29 NFL
Vikings
Texas State 1981 30 WAC
Fresno State 1980 31 Mtn W
Syracuse 1980 31 Big *Impending move to ACC
East*
West Virginia 1980 31 Big
East
Louisiana at 1978 33 Sun
Monroe Belt
New Mexico 1978 33 WAC
State
Southern 1976 35 C USA
Mississippi
New Orleans 1975 36 NFL shared w. Tulane & Sugar &
Saints New Orleans Bowls
Tulane 1975 36 C USA shared w. Saints & Sugar & New
Orleans Bowls
Idaho 1975 36 WAC
Hawaii 1975 36 Mtn W shared w. Hawai'i & NFL Pro
Bowls
Iowa State 1975 36 Big XII
Arkansas 1974 37 Sun
State Belt
Buffalo Bills 1973 38 NFL
Kentucky 1973 38 SEC
Kansas City 1972 39 NFL
Chiefs
Central 1972 39 MAC
Michigan
Washington 1972 39 PAC 12
State
UNL V 1971 40 Mtn W shared w. Las Vegas Bowl
Louisiana at 1971 40 Sun
Lafayette Belt
Boise State 1970 41 Mtn W shared w. Famous Idaho Potato
Bowl
Eastern 1969 42 MAC
Michigan 1__1_1_1
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Kent State 1969 42 MAC
Louisiana 1968 43 WAC
Tech
Utah State 1968 43 WAC
Western 1968 43 Sun
Kentucky Belt
Kansas State 1968 43 Big XII
Wake Forest 1968 43 ACC
Ball State 1967 44 MAC
Memphis 1967 44 C USA shared w. Liberty Bowl
Colorado 1967 44 Mtn W
State
Oregon 1967 44 PAC 12
San Diego 1968 43 NFL shared w. San Diego St &
Chargers Holiday & Poinsettia Bowls
San Diego 1967 44 Mtn W shared w. Chargers & Holiday &
State Poinsettia Bowls
Oakland 1966 45 NFL
Raiders
Bowling 1966 45 MAC
Green
Nevada 1966 45 Mtn W
North 1966 45 ACC
Carolina
State
Northern 1965 46 MAC
Illinois
Virginia Tech 1965 46 ACC
BYU 1964 47 IND
East Carolina 1963 48 C USA
UTEP 1963 48 C USA shared w. Sun Bowl
Air Force 1962 49 Mtn W
San Francisco 1960 51 NFL
49ers
New Mexico 1960 51 Mtn W shared w. New Mexico Bowl
Indiana 1960 51 Big 10
Penn State 1960 51 Big 10
Florida 1959 52 Sun
Atlantic Belt
Navy 1959 52 SEC
Arizona State 1958 53 PAC 12 shared w. Insight Bowl
Green Bay 1957 54 NFL
Packers I
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Boston 1957 54 ACC
College
Oregon State 1953 58 PAC 12
North Texas 1952 59 Sun
Belt
Rice 1950 61 C USA
Troy State 1950 61 Sun
Belt
Wyoming 1950 61 Mtn W
Baylor 1950 61 Big XII
Florida State 1950 61 ACC
Maryland 1950 61 ACC
South 1948 63 Sun shared w. Senior & GoDaddy
Alabama Belt Bowls
Texas Tech 1947 64 Big XH
Jacksonville 1946 65 NFL shared w. Gator Bowl
Jaguars
Houston 1946 65 C USA
Clemson 1942 69 ACC
Akron 1940 71 MAC
Auburn 1939 72 SEC
Arkansas 1938 73 SEC
Toledo 1937 74 MAC
Western 1937 74 MAC
Michigan
South 1934 77 SEC
Carolina
San Jose State 1933 78 WAC
Virginia 1931 80 ACC
Tulsa 1930 81 C USA
Florida 1930 81 SEC
Notre Dame 1930 81 SEC
Texas 1930 81 Big
Christian East
Ohio 1929 82 MAC
Alabama 1929 82 SEC
Arizona 1929 82 PAC 12
Duke 1929 82 ACC
Georgia 1929 82 SEC
Iowa 1929 82 Big 10
Texas A&M 1929 82 Big XII
Alabama at 1927 84 C USA shared w. BBVA Compass Bowl
Birmingham
692013]
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Michigan 1927 84 Big 10
North 1927 84 ACC
Carolina
Missouri 1926 85 Big XII
Northwestern 1926 85 Big 10
Chicago Bears 1924 87 NFL
Army 1924 87 IND
Colorado 1924 87 PAC 12
Louisiana 1924 87 SEC
State
Purdue 1924 87 Big 10
Texas 1924 87 Big XII
California 1923 88 PAC 12
Illinois 1923 88 Big 10
Michigan 1923 88 Big 10
State
Nebraska 1923 88 Big XII
Oklahoma 1923 88 Big XII
Southern Cal 1923 88 PAC 12
Ohio State 1922 89 Big 10
UCLA 1922 89 PAC 12 shared w. Rose Bowl
Vanderbilt 1922 89 SEC
Kansas 1921 90 Big XH
Tennessee 1921 90 SEC
Oklahoma 1920 91 Big XII
State
Washington 1920 91 PAC 12
Wisconsin 1917 94 Big 10
Cincinnati 1916 95 Big
East
Mississippi 1915 96 SEC
Mississippi 1914 97 SEC
State
Georgia Tech 1913 98 ACC
NFL Average Stadium Age 23
Average Year Opened 1988
Automatic BCS Qualifier Average Stadium Age 65
Average Year Opened 1946
BCS Eligible Collegiate Average Stadium Age 56
Average Year Opened 1955
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Appendix 2
Stadium Ages of Collegiate Bowl Games
Collegiate Bowl Game Stadiums Updated 18 Sept. 2011
Age Year Venue
Opened
Cotton Bowl 2 2009 Cowboys Stadium
Pinstripe Bowl 2 2009 Yankee Stadium
Fiesta Bowl 5 2006 Arizona Cardinals home
Texas Bowl 9 2002 Houston Texans home
Little Caesars Pizza 9 2002 Detroit Lions home
Bowl
Armed Forces Bowl 11 2000 SMU home, Ht Worth
Kraft Fight Hunger 11 2000 SF Giants home field
Bowl
Music City Bowl 12 1999 Tennessee Titans home
Outback Bowl 13 1998 Tampa Bay Buccaneers home
Belk Bowl 15 1996 Carolina Panthers home
Alamo Bowl 18 1993 Alamo Dome, San Antonio
Chick-fil-A Bowl 19 1992 Georgia Dome, Atlanta Falcons
home
Beef O'Brady's Bowl 21 1990 Tampa Bay Rays home
Orange Bowl 24 1987 Miami Dolphins & Marlins home
Sugar Bowl 36 1975 New Orleans Saints home
New Orleans Bowl 36 1975 New Orleans Saints home
Hawai'i Bowl 36 1975 Aloha Stadium, Honolulu
Bowl Championship 38.5 Average of Rose, Sugar, Orange & Fiesta
Game
Las Vegas Bowl 40 1971 UNLV Stadium, Las Vegas
Famous Idaho Potato 41 1970 Bronco Stadium
Bowl
Holiday Bowl 43 1968 San Diego Chargers home
Poinsettia Bowl 43 1968 San Diego Chargers home
Liberty Bowl 44 1967 Liberty Bowl Memorial,
Memphis
Sun Bowl 48 1963 Sun Bowl, El Paso
Military Bowl 50 1961 RFK Stadium, DC
New Mexico Bowl 51 1960 U of New Mexico home,
Albuquerque
Insight Bowl 53 1958 Sun Devil Stadium, Tempe
GoDaddy Bowl 63 1948 Ladd Peebles Stadium, Mobile
Gator Bowl 65 1946 Gator Bowl, Jacksonville Jaguars
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home
Capital One Bowl 75 1936 Citrus Bowl, Orlando
Champs Sports Bowl 75 1936 Citrus Bowl, Orlando
Ticket City Bowl 81 1930 Cotton Bowl, Dallas
BBVA Compass Bowl 84 1927 Legion Field, Birmingham
Independence Bowl 86 1925 Independence Bowl, Shreveport
Rose Bowl 89 1922 Rose Bowl, Pasadena
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